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I. INTRODUCTION

Two decades ago the Supreme Court interpreted the Federal Arbitration
Act of 1925 (FAA) as proclaiming a "national policy favoring
arbitration."' Since then the Court has significantly federalized
commercial arbitration. Does this new "arbitration federalism" leave a role
for the states? Given the growing use of private arbitration, this question
is central to the future of civil litigation.
The Supreme Court's stated understanding of the FAA has sent mixed
signals about a state law-making role in commercial arbitration. On the
one hand, the Court has interpreted the FAA to preempt state laws that
negate or undermine the enforceability of commercial arbitration
1. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984).
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clauses-leaving no latitude for state regulation. On the other hand, the
Court has understood the FAA to treat the question of contract revocation,
on generally applicable grounds such as fraud, duress, and unconscionability, as one of state law-leaving no federal role. Additionally, on
a variety of other matters affecting arbitration, the Court seems to
recognize that the FAA speaks either ambiguously or not at all, such as
post-award judicial review, arbitrators' standards of conduct and arbitral
procedures-leaving potential gaps in the Act's pro-arbitration policy.
In this Article we outline a blueprint of "arbitration federalism"--the
principles of FAA preemption-under which states assume a collaborative
role in furthering the national policy favoring commercial arbitration.2 At
the center of the blueprint lies the strong preemptive core of the FAA,
which the Supreme Court has used to strike down state laws that
undermine the validity of commercial arbitration agreements. States can
no longer harbor their historical hostility toward arbitration. Invalid are
state laws that bar arbitration (whether in specified business dealings3 or
consumer transactions4 ), that shunt certain disputes to state court,5 that
limit the remedial power of arbitrators,6 and that impose disclosure
burdens uniquely on arbitration agreements.7 In this core, the validity of
arbitration agreements and the matters that can be arbitrated are beyond
state regulation. States can at most mimic the federal pro-arbitration
standards.
Beyond this core, however, lies a murky sphere (a kind of boundary)
where the FAA speaks, but without the same clarity and force as in the
legislation's provisions on enforceability and arbitrability. For example,
although the FAA specifies standards for judicial review of arbitral
awards, lower federal courts have uniformly discerned additional (though
various) grounds for vacating arbitral awards.' Although the FAA implies
2. This Article does not address arbitration of employment disputes, a topic the Supreme
Court recently brought within the FAA ambit. See Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105
(2001) (holding that employment agreements, other than for transportation workers, are covered
by the FAA).
3. Southland,465 U.S. at 16 (preempting state statute that precluded arbitration of disputes
arising in franchise agreements).
4. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 268 (1995) (preempting state
statute invalidating pre-dispute arbitration agreements, which had been applied to consumer
termite-control contract).
5. Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 (1987) (preempting state statute that prohibited

arbitration in wage disputes).
6. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52,59 (1995) (preempting state
court decision that punitive damages could not be given in arbitration, including securities

arbitration).
7. Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 688 (1996) (preempting state statute
requiring conspicuous disclosure of arbitration clause in franchise agreements).
8. Stephen L. Hayford, Law in Disarray:JudicialStandardsfor Vacatur of Commercial
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that arbitrators have significant discretion in fulfilling their duties, no FAA
standards specify arbitrator behavior and answerability. At the boundary,
the preemptive scope of the new arbitration federalism is sketchy,
suggesting the usefulness of a state role to provide guidance, subject to the
general pro-arbitration policies articulated in the FAA.
As to some matters essential to effective arbitration, mostly involving
the arbitral process, the FAA is palpably silent. Nowhere does the FAA

mention pre-hearing discovery, summary disposition, consolidation of
claims, or provisional remedies. All are critical-as they are in court
adjudication-to fair and efficient dispute resolution. Whether Congress
(or the Supreme Court) imagined that these matters would be resolved
through private agreement, standardized arbitration rules, or industry
practice is unclear. In this large penumbra, state law in the form of default
procedural rules holds out great promise, limited only by the gravitational
pull of the FAA's pro-arbitration imperative.
Although some have decried the Supreme Court's revamped
"arbitration federalism" as judicial legerdemain, given the FAA's original
limited purpose to validate arbitration agreements only in federal court,
there is no use in crying over spilt milk.' The Court's revisionism,
effectively creating a national policy favoring arbitration, has shown itself
to have legs.'" Reflecting the Court's continuing eagerness to unclog the
federaljudiciary's civil dockets and its abiding respect for private ordering
in commercial matters, the judicially revised FAA resonates." Whatever
the statute may have meant originally and however its drafters may have

ArbitrationAwards, 30 GA. L. REv. 731, 763-838 (1996) (describing the numerous nonstatutory
grounds for vacatur embraced and applied by the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals).
9. Paul D. Carrington & Paul A. Haagen, Contract andJurisdiction,1996 SUP. CT. REV.
331,333.
10. The Court's seminal FAA preemption case, Southland, has withstood a barrage of
criticism from inside and outside the Court. Justice O'Connor's well-researched dissent laid out a
powerful case against the majority's preemptive analysis. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S.
1, 21-36 (1984) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). A decade later, twenty state attorneys general filed
briefs to overturn the Southlandpreemption. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265,
284 (1995). Justice Thomas, who joined the Court after Southland,continues to dissent from any
decision based on its holding. See Doctor'sAssocs., 517 U.S. at 689 (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(decrying the Court's "remaking of arbitration law" in its FAA preemption cases). Justice Scalia,
though accepting Southlandfor the purposes of deciding cases with the majority, has announced
his willingness to join four other Justices who might choose to abandon the Southlandpreemption.
Terminix, 513 U.S. at 284-85 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Southlandentails apermanent, unauthorized
eviction of state-court power to adjudicate apotentially large class of disputes.... I shall not in the
future dissent from judgments that rest on Southland.I will, however, stand ready to join four other
Justices in overruling it, since Southlandwill not become more correct over time.").
11. See Alan R. Palmiter, The CTS Gambit: Stanchingthe FederalizationofCorporateLaw,
69 WASH. U. L.Q. 445 (1991) (describing the Supreme Court's predilection for incorporation-based
private ordering in corporate law).
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conceived the legislation's original jurisdictional reach, it has become
today a national charter of private arbitral freedom.
But the Supreme Court's arbitration federalism is incomplete. For the
most part, state arbitration statutes modeled on the 1955 Uniform
Arbitration Act (UAA)"2 are as sparse as the FAA. To date, the state
legislative adaptations of the UAA, as interpreted and applied by state
courts, have not filled the voids left by the FAA in any systematic or
consistent fashion. And law, like nature, abhors a vacuum.
In this Article we assert that states retain a vital, even essential, role in
furthering the goals of a national pro-arbitration policy. State arbitration
rules, particularly when cast as default rules from which parties can opt
out, offer wide hope: the efficient filling of gaps left in parties'
agreements, economical specification of cumbersome terms, instructive
experimentation among the states, and sensitivity to specific commercial
practices. State arbitration law can also serve to overcome the lingering
judicial (and legislative) hostility to pre-dispute arbitration and to give
balanced life to privately negotiated arbitration agreements. In the process,
state law would fulfill the twin promises of the FAA to eradicate the legal
system's entrenched hostility to arbitration and to honor the parties'
arbitration choice.
The January 2001 promulgation of the Revised Uniform Arbitration
Act (RUAA) by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws (NCCUSL) portends a new era in state involvement in the
arbitration process. Over time, RUAA promises to catalyze a state role in
the federalism scheme envisioned in the Supreme Court's embrace of
commercial arbitration. It is an ineluctable role that arises from the
intersection of the pro-arbitration public policy identified by the Court and
the minimalist nature of the federal statute.
We review and critique RUAA's attempt to add clarity and certainty
to the arbitration process, within the preemption blueprint drawn by the
Supreme Court's "arbitration federalism."' 3 In general, the RUAA accepts
that the proper role for state arbitration law is to provide default rules and
standards in areas not expressly regulated by the FAA or pertinent federal
case law. Yet the RUAA occasionally wanders from the blueprint's
possibilities, seeking sometimes to over-regulate the arbitration process
and other times merely to mimic the FAA's barebones approach. We lay
out considerations for state legislative drafters and state judges who will
be responsible for formulating a revised state role in fhe revamped
"arbitration federalism."
12. UNIF.ARBITRATION ACT (1955).
13. This blueprint is based on the experience of one of the authors as Academic Advisor to
the Drafting Committee appointed by the National Conference to revise the 1955 Uniform
Arbitration Act.
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II. SCOPE OF THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT
A. FAA Text: Validation and Enforcement of
CommercialArbitration
The Federal Arbitration Act grew out of a business-led reform
movement in the 1920s to overcome the longstanding judicial hostility to
the enforcement of pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate.' 4 Passed without
dissent in 1925'" and amended only lightly since,' 6 the FAA is a quick
read.17 Its focus is on judicial respect for commercial arbitration at the
front end and back end of the arbitral process.
At the front end, the Act announces the validity and enforceability of
arbitration clauses "in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing

a transaction involving commerce."'" The only express limitation is when.
the clause would be revocable "upon such grounds as exist at lawv or in
equity for the revocation of any contract."' 9 The FAA further directs
14. The Supreme Court had issued Congress an invitation to act. See Red Cross Line v.
Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109, 120-22 (1924). "In the absence of statute it is the general rule that
executory contracts to submit disputes to arbitration will not be specifically enforced.... If there
be a right to specific performance of an arbitration provision in a collective bargaining agreement
we must find it in an act of Congress." Lincoln Mills v. Textile Workers Union, 230 F.2d 81, 84
(1956).
15. The original FAA bill, which had died late in the 1922 legislative session, was
reintroduced in late 1923. The federal bills were subject to joint hearings before subcommittees of
the House and Senate Judiciary Committees. The House Judiciary Committee favorably reported
the House bill, which passed the House unanimously without amendment on June 6, 1924. The
Senate Judiciary Committee made amendments to the Senate bill and favorably reported the revised
bill to the Senate, which passed the bill without amendment on January 21, 1925. The House
concurred in the Senate amendments, and the bill was signed into law by President Coolidge on
February 12, 1925. "[N]ot a single dissenting vote was registered in either House or Senate,"
American Bar Association Committee on Commerce, Trade and Commercial Law, The United
States ArbitrationLaw and Its Application, I I A.B.A.J. 153 (1925). The United States Arbitration

Act became effective January 1, 1926.
16. Act of July 30, 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-282 §1, 61 Stat. 669; Act of July 31, 1970, Pub. L.
91-368, §2,84 Stat. 692; Act ofNov. 16, 1988, Pub. L. 100-669, §1, 102 Stat. 3969; Act of Nov.
19, 1988, Pub. L. 100-702, § 1019(b), 102 Stat. 4642; Act of Dec. 1, 1990, Pub. L. 101-650, §
325(a)(1), 104 Stat. 5089.
17. See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (2000).
18. Id. § 2. The Supreme Court has read the FAA's coverage to extend to the full limits of
Congress's modem commerce clause powers. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S.
265, 272-78 (1995) (finding "intent to exercise Congress' commerce power to the full").
19. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000). The Supreme Court has stated this is the
only limitation on the validity and enforceability of an arbitration agreement in a maritime or
interstate contract. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1984). Furthermore, the only
revocation standards that courts can use are those that apply generally to contracts. Perry v.
Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 (1987).
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"courts of the United States" when presented with a valid arbitration
agreement to stay their proceedings and to compel arbitration against
recalcitrant parties" and, if necessary, to name arbitrators and order the
attendance of witnesses.2
At the back end, the Act outlines the procedures for U.S. district courts
to confirm and enforce arbitral awards.22 The Act specifies limited
procedural and substantive grounds for district courts to vacate arbitral
awards.' In addition, the Act permits district courts to modify or correct
awards in cases of evident material mistake or other technical defects.24
The Act sets out procedures for obtaining these orders25 and cuts off
interlocutory appeals once the district court has determined that a
controversy is arbitrable.26
The FAA's twin purposes, according to the Supreme Court, are to
eradicate judicial hostility to pre-dispute arbitration agreements and to

20. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2000). The FAA compels arbitration if a party has
improperly filed suit: "any of the courts of the United States... shall on application of one of the
parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms
of the agreement." Id. In addition, the FAA authorizes U.S. district courts, upon petition and after
a hearing, to order arbitration ifa party has failed to submit to arbitration as provided by agreement:
"any United States district court which, save for such agreement, would havejurisdiction under title
28 ... shall make an order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the
terms of the agreement." Id. § 4.
21. Id. § 5. If no arbitrator or method for appointment is specified in the parties' agreement,
"the court" may appoint an arbitrator. Id. Furthermore, "any United States district court" where the
arbitrators are sitting may compel the attendance ofwitnesses and hold them in contempt for failing
to appear. Id.
22. Id. § 9. Upon application for a court order confirming an arbitral award, "the United
States court in and for the district" where the award was made "must grant such an order" unless
"vacated, modified or corrected." Id. The section specifies the methods for service of notice of the
application to enter the award: if the adverse party is a resident of the "district," service is as
prescribed for "an action in such court," if the adverse party is a non-resident, service is by "the
marshal of any district" where the adverse party may be found. Id.
23. Id. § 10. A party to the arbitration may apply to have the district court vacate the award
on one of four grounds: (1) corruption, fraud, or undue means; (2) evident arbitrator partiality or
corruption; (3) arbitrator misconduct; or (4) excess or imperfect execution of arbitrator powers. Id.
After vacating an award, the court may direct an arbitral rehearing. Id.
24. Id. § 11. The district court may modify the award upon the application of any party if(a)
there was an evident material miscalculation or mistake in the award, (b) the arbitrators awarded
on a significant matter not submitted to them, or (c) the award is imperfect in form not affecting
the merits of the controversy. Id. The order may modify and correct the award, so as to effect the
intent thereof and promote justice between the parties. Id.
25. Id. §§ 12-13. As with the procedures for the entry of an arbitral award, the FAA
contemplates service of process comparable to that for other actions in federal district court. Id.
26. Id. § 16. As amended by the Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act of 1988,
the FAA bars appellate review of interlocutory pro-arbitration orders to ensure that the appeals
process does not undermine expeditious arbitration. Id. Appellate review of such orders is
postponed until after the entry of an arbitral award. Id.
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protect party expectations by putting arbitration agreements on the same
footing as other contracts.27
B. FAA Metamorphosisfrom "Federal" to "National"
Arbitration Policy
The FAA was originally intended as the 'federal" piece in the national
movement to legitimize executory arbitration clauses. Over time the
Supreme Court has remade the FAA into the cornerstone of a new
"arbitration federalism." The remaking of the statute, far from cataclysmic,
has proceeded in stages. Drawing from Erie in diversity cases, the Court
came to interpret the FAA to supersede state anti-arbitration standards in
federal diversity cases. Then, applying a post-New Deal preemption
analysis, the Court expanded this "substantive" pro-arbitration policy into
a "national policy" applicable in state courts. Finally, on the assumption
Congress had acted pursuant to its full commerce clause powers in
enacting the FAA, the Court extended this "national policy" to all
commercial contracts. Over time, as the Court's attitude toward private
arbitral choice shifted, the original FAA's notions of circumscribed federal
power succumbed to new jurisdictional understandings.
1. The Original "Federal Courts" Legislation
The United States Arbitration Act of 1925, as the federal law was first
named, was not meant to be "national." Rather, the legislation's
proponents sought a federal statute that would enact a pro-arbitration
policy in federal courts. 8 In passing federal legislation, Congress joined
a national movement to legislate, jurisdiction by jurisdiction, a legal
climate favorable to commercial arbitration.
Congress intended modestly that the FAA would compel federalcourts
to respect arbitration agreements and place them on the same footing as
other commercial contracts, just as comparable state statutes compelled
state judges to abandon their antagonism to arbitration. As the Senate
Report explained, the federal legislation had a narrow reach,
complementing the firmer and broader jurisdictional reach of state
arbitration law: "The bill, while relating to maritime transactions and to
27. As the Supreme Court stated in Southland, "the purpose of the act was to assure those
who desired arbitration... 'that their expectations would not be undermined by federal judges,
or... by state courts or legislatures." Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 13 (1995) (quoting
Metro Indus. Painting Corp. v. Terminal Constr. Corp., 287 F.2d 382,387 (2d Cir. 1961) (Lombard,
C.J., concurring)). The Court concluded: "The problems Congress faced were therefore twofold:
the old common law hostility toward arbitration, and the failure of state arbitration statutes to
mandate enforcement of arbitration agreements." Id. at 14.

28.

IAN

R.

MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION

LAW 83-121 (Oxford Univ. Press, 1992)

(describing the political impetus aid enactment of the U.S. Arbitration Act).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol54/iss2/1

8

Hayford and Palmiter: Arbitration Federalism: A State Role in Commercial Arbitration
22

STATE ROLE IN COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION

contracts in interstate and foreign commerce, follows the lines of the New
York arbitration law enacted in 1920, amended in 1921, and sustained by
the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in ...1924.,29
That the Act was meant to extend only to the validation and
enforcement of arbitration agreements infederalcourts is clear from every
direction-the statutory text refers only tofederalcourts-namely, "courts
of the United States" and "United States district courts. ' 30 The legislative
history focuses exclusively on the history of federaljudicial antagonism
to arbitration and the nature of federal court jurisdiction.31 Contemporary
commentators went to lengths in describing the federal jurisdictional
aspects (and pitfalls) of the legislation.32 Early lower courts explained that
the statute was not meant to confer validity on arbitration agreements33
generally, but to deal with the "conduct of suits in federal court.
Subsequent legislative changes clarified which federalcourts would have
jurisdiction over original cases and appeals.34

29. S.REP. No. 569-536, at 3 (1924).
30. See generally Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (2000). The text of the Act
speaks exclusively to "courts of the United States," including the "United States district court" and
"the United States court in and for the district [where an arbitral award was made]." See, e.g.,
Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 9-11 (2000). The Act thus adopts the same language---"courts
of the United States"--as other contemporary statutes addressed to federal courts. See, e.g., 28
U.S.C. § 2201 (2000) (pertaining to declaratory judgments); FED. R. EVID. 501; Norris LaGuardia
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 104 (2000); see also Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union Local 770,398 U.S.
235, 247 (1970). To designate both federal and state courts, federal statutes use a different
vocabulary-namely, "courts in the United States" or "courts within the United States." See, e.g.,
11 U.S.C. § 306 (2000); 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (2000); 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2000).
31. H.R. REP. No.96, at 2 (1924) ("The bill.., provides a procedure in the Federal courts
for [arbitration agreements] enforcement"). After a thorough review of the legislative history,
Justice O'Connor concluded: "One rarely finds a legislative history as unambiguous as the FAA's.
That history establishes conclusively that the 1925 Congress viewed the FAA as a procedural
statute, applicable only in federal courts, derived, Congress believed, largely from the federal power
to control the jurisdiction of the federal courts." Southland, 465 U.S. at 25 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
32. See Julius Henry Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The New FederalArbitrationLaw, 12 VA.
L. REv. 265, 277-78 (1926); Wesley A. Sturges & Irving Olds Murphy, Some Confusing Matters
Relating to Arbitration Underthe United States ArbitrdtionAct, 17 LAW & CONTEP. PROB. 580,
586-88, 604 (1952) (commenting on federal act's limited coverage of maritime transactions and
transactions in commerce); Note, Scope of the United States Arbitration Act in Commercial
Arbitration:Problems in Federalism,58 Nw.U. L. REv. 468, 492 (1963); see also Krauss Bros.
Lumber Co. v. Louis Bossert & Sons, Inc., 62 F.2d 1004, 1006 (2d Cir. 1933).
33. Donahue v. Susquehanna Collieries Co., 138 F.2d 3, 5 (3d Cir. 1943) (stating that
conferring validity on arbitration agreements generally would be "a matter outside the scope of
federal powers"); see also Int'l Union United Furniture Workers of Am. v. Colonial Hardwood
Flooring Co., .168 F.2d 33, 36-37 (4th Cir. 1948) (finding that FAA directives are addressed only
to courts of the United States, within the plenary jurisdiction of the Congress to regulate federal
court procedures).
34. In 1954, in a purely clerical change, Congress inserted "United States district court" in
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The FAA created no new rights and no independent federal-question
jurisdiction.35 Rather, cast as a "procedural" statute, it declared the validity
of arbitration agreements and mandated procedures to ensure their
enforceability in the federal court "in which such suit is pending" or
"which, save for such agreement, would have jurisdiction" over the
controversy between the parties.36 The statutory text and legislative history
reflect the pains the drafters took to avoid the jurisdictional problems that
would have arisen if Congress in 1925 had attempted to legislate broadly
concerning a commercial matter affecting state jurisdiction.3' The FAA's
non-controversial enactment buttresses that it was understood to be little
more than "federal courts" legislation, surely not a significant departure
from contemporary jurisdictional assumptions.
At the time of the FAA's enactment, commercial disputes fell within
the jurisdiction of either state courts applying state law or federal courts
sitting in diversity applying federal common law. This presented serious
jurisdictional obstacles to all-encompassing national arbitration legislation,
given the reigning assumptions that Congress lacked the power to regulate
section 4 as asubstitute for "court of the United States." H.R. Rep. No 83-198b, at 8 (1954); S. REP.
No. 83-2498, at 8 (1954), reprinted in 1954U.S.C.C.A.N. 3991,3998 (explaining that substitution
"because, among Federal courts, such a proceeding would be brought only in a district court").
35. 65 Cong. Rec. 1931 (1924). On the House floor Representative Graham, one of the bill's
sponsors, emphasized: "[The bill] creates no new legislation, grants no new rights, except a remedy
to enforce an agreement in commercial contracts and in admiralty contracts." Id. The ABA
Committee wrote: "The jurisdiction exists in those cases in which, under the Judicial Code, the
Federal Courts would normally have jurisdiction of the controversy between the parties."
Committee on Commerce, Trade & Commercial Law, The United States ArbitrationAct and Its
Application, 11 A.B.A. J. 153, 154 (1925).
36. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 3, 4 (2000). Numerous passages in the legislative
history echo the "federal courts" theme. The House Report stated:
Whether an agreement for arbitration shall be enforced or not is a question of
procedure to be determined by the law court in which the proceeding is brought
and not one of substantive law to be determined by the law of the forum in which
the contract is made. . . . The bill declares that such agreements shall be
recognized and enforced by the courts of the United States.... The bill declares
simply that such agreements for arbitration shall be enforced, and provides a
procedure in the Federal courts for their enforcement.
H.R. REP. No. 96, at 1-2. The Act's principal drafter, Julius Cohen, stated before the Joint
Committee: "The theory on which you do this is that you have the right to tell the Federal courts
how to proceed." Arbitration oflnterstateCommercialDisputes:HearingBefore the JointComm.,
of Subcomm. on the Judiciary,68th Cong. 17 (1924) (statement of Mr. Cohen, American Bar
Association).
37. The House Committee, recognizing the jurisdictional thin ice on which Congress was
treading, specified an alternative justification for legislative power: "The control over interstate
commerce reaches not only the actual physical interstate shipment of goods but also contracts
relating to interstate commerce." H.R. REP. No. 96, at 1.
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state court procedure or to specify rules of decision in federal diversity
cases. 8 Any broad congressional enactment to compel judicial
enforcement of private commercial arbitration would have skated on very

thin jurisdictional ice.
The FAA was to be the federal piece of the national, state-led
movement to legitimize commercial arbitration jurisdiction by
jurisdiction.39 As explained in the House Report, the states would continue
to determine the validity of arbitral clauses in cases arising under state
court jurisdiction: "Whether an agreement for arbitration shall be enforced
or not is a question of procedure to be determined by the law court in
which the proceeding is brought and not one of substantive law to be
determined by the law of the forum in which the contract is made."4'
38, In 1925, U.S. commercial law lived under the shadow ofSwiftv. Tyson, which had given
to the federal courts sitting in diversity the task of creating a general common law applicable to
national commerce. 41 U.S. 1 (1842). Whether out of deference or jurisdictional impotence,
Congress had accepted the fashioning of a federal common law in diversity cases as a bulwark
against state commercial hindrance and backwardness. Herbert Hovenkamp, FederalismRevised,
34 HASTINGS L.J. 201 (1982) (reviewing TONY FREYER, HARMONY & DISSONANCE: THESwIFT&
ERui-CASES INAMERICAN FEDERALISM (1981)) (describing Justice Story's purpose inSwfiv. Tyson
to overcome the parochialism of state commercial law). The fundamental implication of Swift that
federal courts (not Congress) offered protection to businesses operating in the national economy
was in the 1920s largely accepted as an integral part of American federalism. As Justice Brandeis
was to observe in Erie, "The federal courts assumed, in the broad field of 'general law,' the power
to declare rules of decision which Congress was confessedly without power to enact as statutes."
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 72 (1938). Although in the mid-1920s there was growing
criticism of this federal judicial law-making, particularly over commercial matters, Swift was still
alive and well. See Charles Warren, New Light on the Historyof the FederalJudiciaryAct of] 789,
37 HARv. L. REV. 49 (1923) (re-examining the legislative history of the Rules Decision Act and
concluding that Congress had intended that the federal courts would defer to both state legislative
and judge-made law, absent a controlling federal law). For example, the Supreme Court in 1928
reaffirmed the power of federal courts to determine the validity of commercial practices in the face
of contrary state judicial doctrine. Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow
Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 530 (1928). Eventually, when the Supreme Court overruled
Swift in 1938, thirteen years after the FAA's enactment, the decision in Erie would come as
"unexpected." See J.H. FRIENDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE (3d ed. 1999).
39. As the ABA Committee on Commerce, Trade and Commercial Law explained, the FAA
is a "a single step in a movement of growing momentum [which] declares simply the policy of
recognizing and enforcing arbitration agreements in the Federal courts. It does not encroach upon
the province of the individual States." Committee on Commerce, supra note 35, at 155.
40. Before the Joint Committee, Mr. Cohen (the principal drafter of the federal legislation)
stated:
Nor can it be said that the Congress of the United States, directing its own
courts... would infringe upon the provinces or prerogatives of the States....
[T]he question of the enforcement relates to the law of remedies and not to
substantive law. The rule must be changed for the jurisdiction in which the
agreement is sought to be enforced .... There is no disposition therefore by means
of the Federal bludgeon to force an individual State into an unwilling submission
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This dual-track federalism animated the arbitration reform movement
and judicial decision-making during the first thirty years after the FAA's
enactment. Ultimately, the state movement culminated in 1955 with the
promulgation by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws of the Uniform Arbitration Act, one of the most successful of
the uniform laws.4
2. The FAA Applied in Diversity Cases
The "arbitration federalism" originally envisioned by the FAA rested
on jurisdictional assumptions that supplied a simple rule of thumb: the
validity of an arbitration clause depended on the court having jurisdiction
over the dispute. On the assumption arbitration clauses would appear in
federal court either in a "maritime transaction" or "a contract evidencing
a transaction involving commerce," Congress covered its bases.42 But the
tidy assumption that an interstate transaction would be governed by federal
law was brought into question in 1938 with the Supreme Court's decision
in Erie Railway v. Tompkins, which curbed the power of federal courts to
create "federal common law" in diversity suits.43
The effect of Erie on the FAA, however, was slow in fully manifesting
itself. Although Erie toppled the assumption of Swift v. Tyson that federal
courts can create national commercial policy in diversity cases-an
assumption that had hobbled the FAA drafters and led them to draft a
procedural statute-it was not immediately clear whether arbitration
agreements in diversity cases would be judged by federal or state
standards. In 1945, the Supreme Court had held in GuarantyTrust Co. v.
York44 that federal courts sitting in diversity were not to apply federal rules
that "substantially affect the enforcement of the right as given by the
state," suggesting the FAA's arbitration mandate would be trumped in
to arbitration enforcement.
ArbitrationofInterstate CommercialDisputes:Hearingon H.R. 646 andS.1005 Before the Joint
Comm. ofSubcomm. on the Judiciary,68th Cong. 39 (1924). Post-enactment explanations echoed
this idea. See Cohen & Dayton, supra note 32, at 276 (stating that "whether or not an arbitration
agreement is to be enforced is a question of the law of procedure and is determined by the law of
the jurisdiction wherein the remedy is sought").
41. The Act, adopted in 1955 and revised in 1956, was a successor to an earlier state uniform
act promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1924.
See MACNEIL, supra note 28, at 54-57 (describing state movement to adopt modem general
arbitration statutes, a majority based on the UAA); see also Stephen J.Ware, "Opt-in "forJudicial
Review of Errors ofLaw Under the Revised Uniform ArbitrationAct, 8 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 263
(1999) (reporting that 35 states have enacted the Uniform Arbitration Act and 14 other states have
substantially similar laws).
42. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
43. 304 U.S. at 78.
44. 362 U.S. 99 (1945).
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diversity cases by contrary outcome-determinative state arbitration
standards. 5
In 1957, the Supreme Court seemed to agree in Bernhardt v.
Polygraphic Co. of America,46 a federal diversity case in which the
defendant had moved for a stay pending arbitration as provided in the
parties' employment contract.47 The Court found arbitration, compared to
court litigation, to be outcome determinative and commented "arbitration,
whatever its merits or shortcomings, substantially affects the cause of
action created by the State" and a change "from a court of law to an
arbitration panel may make a radical difference in ultimate result."' 8 But
the Court sidestepped the Erie question with a crimped interpretation of
the jurisdictional reach of FAA section 2 and concluded the in-state
employment contract did not involve "interstate commerce. ' The Court
held that state law, which permitted pre-award revocation by either party,
governed their agreement. °
Evidencing a lingering judicial suspicion of arbitration, the Bernhardt
Court explained the reasons for Vermont's anti-arbitration policy:
Arbitration carries no right to trial by jury that is guaranteed
both by the Seventh Amendment and . . . the Vermont
Constitution. Arbitrators do not have the benefit of judicial
instruction on the law; they need not give their reasons for
their results; the record of their proceedings is not as
complete as it is in a court trial; and judicial review of an
award is more limited than judicial review of a trial."
Following the lead of Bernhardt,lower courts sitting in diversity resolved
the conflict between the FAA and state arbitration standards by applying
the state standards.52 Under this outcome-determinative approach,
uniformity became the watchword in upholding state policies inimical to
arbitration.

45. Id. at 109.
46. 350 U.S. 198 (1956).

47. Id. at 199.
48. Id. at 203.
49. See id.at 201-02,
50. Id. at 211-12.
51. Id. at 203.
52. See, e.g., Warren Bros. Co. v. Cardi Corp., 471 F.2d 1304, 1307-10 (Ist Cir. 1973)
(holding in a diversity action that Massachusetts law governed whether court action should be
stayed pending arbitration); Reeves v. Tarvizian, 351 F.2d 889, 891 (1st Cir. 1965) (holding that
Massachusetts law controlled the question of whether an arbitration award is resjudicataand
enforceable by acourtorder); Formigli Corp. v. AlcarBuilders, Inc., 329 F.2d 79,81 (3d Cir. 1964)
(citing Bernhardtand holding in diversity action that an arbitration agreement is enforceable when
the substantive law of the forum state made the agreement binding).
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In 1964, the Supreme Court in Hanna v. Plumer5 3 abandoned its
outcome-determinative approach in diversity cases, deciding that a federal
policy (such as the pro-arbitration policy of the FAA) would trump
contrary state law--even if the federal policy determined the outcome. 4
The Court held that Erie was not meant merely to ensure uniform
decisions between federal diversity and state cases, but rather to
implement federal policy.'5 In the face of a valid federal5 6rule or statute,
federal courts sitting in diversity are to apply federal law.
The lesson of Hanna v. Plumer was soon applied to an arbitration
agreement in a federal diversity case. In Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood &
Conklin Manufacturing Co.,57 the Supreme Court held that FAA standards
(not contrary state standards) governed the validity of commercial
arbitration clauses in federal diversity cases.5 8 The Court turned to FAA
section 4 to determine whether a claim of fraud in the inducement of a
contract, which included an arbitration clause, should be resolved by the
federal court sitting in diversity or referred to arbitration. 9 The Court
found ihat, except where the parties intend otherwise, FAA section 4
mandates that
if the claim is fraud in the inducement of the arbitration
clause itself-an issue which goes to the "making" of the
agreement to arbitrate-the federal court may proceed to
adjudicate it. But the statutory language does not permit the
federal court to consider claims of fraud in the inducement of
the contract generally.0
Prima Paint was an ineluctable application of Hanna v. Plumer:
"Congress may prescribe how federal courts are to conduct themselves
with respect to subject matter over which Congress plainly has power to
legislate. ' 61 True to the "federal courts" nature of the FAA, PrimaPaint
made questions of arbitrability a matter of federal law, both as to
procedure and substance, when in federal court. 62

53. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
54. Id. at 473-74.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
58. Id. at 401.
59. Id. at 400.
60. Id. at 403-04.
61. Id. at 405.
62. The Court then gratuitously concluded that "the [FAA) is based upon and confined to the
incontestable federal foundations of 'control over interstate commerce and over admiralty.' Id.
(quoting H.R. REP. No. 96, at 1 (1924)).
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Prima Paint reflected two fundamental shifts in "arbitration
federalism."6 First, the Court's decision to make the FAA fully applicable
in diversity cases, even if arbitration would "significantly affect the result
of a litigation," reflected ajudicial willingness to draw jurisdictional lines
whose effect favored arbitration." Second, the Court's decision displaced
state arbitration law infederal court.6
But PrimaPaintseemed to leave intact the original assumption when
the FAA was enacted that the validity of an arbitration clause depends on
the court where the dispute is brought. Under the Court's approach, an
arbitration clause could well be valid in federal court under FAA
standards, yet invalid in state court under hostile state law. This too was
about to change.
3. The New "National Policy" Favoring Arbitration in State Court
The FAA's original "arbitration federalism" had no preemptive effect,
given its limited role to validate and enforce arbitration agreements in
federal court. In fact, during the FAA's first sixty years, only a handful of
state cases even considered the question of FAA preemption, and they
uniformly held that the statute was procedural, applicable only in federal
court.66 But as the role of federal law grew generally during the post-New
Deal era, so too did the Court's preemption jurisprudence. When
comprehensive federal legislation spoke, the Court held that inconsistent
state laws had to give way.67 And as federal dockets became more
congested, the Court became increasingly sympathetic toward the
arbitration alternative.68
In the 1984 watershed case ofSouthlandCorp.v. Keating,the Supreme
Court combined its robust preemption jurisprudence and its new-found
acceptance of arbitration to transform the FAA into a "national" policy

63. See Linda R. Hirshman, The Second Arbitration Trilogy: The Federalization of

ArbitrationLaw, 71 VA. L. REv. 1305 (1985) (recognizing that PrimaPaintwas the pivotal point
in the Court's jurisdictional expansion of the FAA).
64. See generallyPrimaPaint, 388 U.S. at 395.

65. See generally id.
66. See, e.g., Wilson & Co. v. Fremont Cake & Meal Co., 43 N.W.2d 657 (Neb. 1950)
(ignoring request to apply FAA sections 2, 3 and 4); Deep S. Oil Co. v. Texas Gas Corp., 328
S.W.2d 897, 906 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959) (refusing to give a declaratory judgment based on FAA
section 2, which the court viewed as procedural and applicable only in federal court).
67. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52,67 (1941) (invalidating state alien registration law
in light of federal statute governing same conduct). See generallyLAUREN CE H.TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 6-28, 6-29 (3d ed. 2000).
68. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1,3 (1983) (upholding
power of federal court to compel arbitration, where state court might not); see also Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 633-34 (1985) (requiring that
potentially complex antitrust claims be arbitrated).
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favoring arbitration.69 In an appeal from a California Supreme Court
decision applying a California statute that barred arbitration of franchise
disputes in the state, the Court imaginatively marshaled bits and pieces
from prior FAA opinions, all of which had arisen infederal court, to erect
an imposing preemption structure applicable in state court.70 From Prima
Paint,the Court took the premise that the FAA rested "on the authority of
Congress to enact substantive rules under the Commerce Clause."71 From
a concurring opinion in a Second Circuit decision, the Court extracted that
the purpose of the Act was to assure the enforceability of arbitration in
interstate contracts.72 From an earlier Court decision involving the effect
on arbitration of parallel state court proceedings, the Court took from a
footnote that the FAA "creates a body of federal substantive law ' 73 and
from dicta that "Federal law in the terms of the Arbitration Act governs
that issue in either state or federal court. 74 Citing to an observation by
Justice Black in his Prima Paint dissent, the Court added that "when
Congress exercises its authority to enact substantive federal law under the
Commerce Clause, it normally creates rules that are enforceable in state
as well as federal courts. 75
Having laid out the structure of its syllogism, the Southland Court then
turned to the FAA's legislative history. Although recognizing that "the
legislative history is not without ambiguities," the Court concluded that
"Congress had in mind something more than making arbitration
agreements enforceable only in the federal courts. 7 6 In response to a
mountain of evidence ably compiled by Justice O'Connor in her dissenting
opinion, that the 1925 Congress and the Act's drafters viewed the
legislation as only federal, the majority decision latched onto a passage in
a House Report that stated: "The purpose of this bill is to make valid and
enforceable agreements for arbitration contained in contracts involving

69. See generally Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
70. See generally id.
71. Id. at 1. In Prima Paint, the Court examined the legislative history of the Act and
concluded that the statute "is based upon.., the incontestable federal foundations of 'control over
interstate commerce and over admiralty."' Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388
U.S. 395, 405 (1967) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 96, at 1 (1924)).
72. Southland, 465 U.S. at 813 (quoting Metro Indus. Painting Corp. v. Terminal Constr.
Corp., 287 F.2d 382, 387 (2d Cir. 1961) (Lumbard, C. J., concurring)) (stating that "the purpose
of the act was to assure those who desired arbitration and whose contracts related to interstate
commerce that their expectations would not be undermined by federal judges, or... by state courts
or legislatures").
73. Id. at 12 (citing Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 26
n.32 (1983)).
74. Id. (citing Moses Cone, 460 U.S. at 23).
75. Id. (citing Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 420 (Black, J., dissenting)).
76. Id.
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interstate commerce or within the jurisdiction [of] admiralty, or which
'
may be the subject of litigation in the Federal courts."77
The Southland majority then revealed its agenda. Transporting the
1925 Congress to 1984, the Court "inferred... that Congress would be
less likely to address a problem whose impact was confined to federal
courts" in the face of "a problem of large significance in the field of
commerce."7 8 Although entirely imaginable that a post-New Deal
Congress would take national aim at "the rule... that equity will not
specifically enforce any arbitration agreement," the Southland majority
was purposefully oblivious to the legislation's context.79 Referring to the
legislative history about the longstanding judicial antagonism to
arbitration, the majority sought to disguise its slight of hand with a
rhetorical flourish: "Surely this makes clear that the House Report
contemplated a broad reach of the Act, unencumbered by state law
constraints.""
Absent from the majority's discussion was any mention of the
contemporaneous movement in state legislatures to modernize state
arbitration statutes. Although noting the two obstacles that commercial
arbitration faced in 1925, namely "the old common law hostility toward
arbitration, and the failure of state arbitration statutes to -mandate
enforcement of arbitration agreements," the Court assumed these to be the
problems that Congress faced."' But in 1925 a congressional attempt to
eradicate state animosity towards arbitration would have usurped
jurisdictional boundaries."2 The Lochner-era Congress lacked the power
to legislate substantive standards applicable in state courts.83 Although
77. Id. at 12-13 (citing H.R. REP. No. 96, at 1 (1924)).
78. Id. at 13.
79. See id.
80. Id.
81. Id. The Southland majority pointed to a perplexing ambiguity in the FAA text. If the
statute was indeed "federal courts" legislation, why did its drafters feel compelled to limit the FAA
to "contracts 'involving commerce'? Id. As the Court pointed out, no similar limitations exist in
other federal statutes that prescribe federal court procedures. But far from suggestingjurisdictional
boldness, the "contracts involving commerce" proviso evidences jurisdictional caution. Congress
enacted the FAA on the basis of the pre-Erie understanding that in diversity cases federal courts
(not Congress) have plenary power to adopt their own "general common law." Only if legislating
within its enumerated powers, arguably, could Congress intrude on this judicial law-making
authority. Thus, to make arbitration agreements fully enforceable in federal court, the 1925
Congress sought to improve the statute's chances in a jurisdictional challenge by exercising its
power over "contracts involving commerce." To have simply compelled federal courts in diversity
cases to accept arbitration agreements would have been legislative overreaching-at least by preErie standards.

82. Id. at 13.
83. Lochnerv. New York, 198 U.S. 45,53-58 (1905) (invalidating state minimum-hours law
as unconstitutional exercise of police powers and interference with employer and employee due
process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment).
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hostility toward arbitration agreements was widely dispersed in state and
federal courts, the FAA's sponsors sought only an end to federal judicial
hostility. The sponsors understood that state legislation would have to deal
with state judicial hostility.
Yet the Southland majority disregarded, even disdained, the
constitutional and jurisdictional strictures that Congress faced in 1925:
"[W]e cannot believe Congress intended to limit the Arbitration Act to
disputes subject only to federal court jurisdiction."' 4 Instead, the Court
chose to remake jurisdictional history, transporting the jurisdictionally
cautious 1925 statute into the rich post-New Deal jurisdictional
environment. "In enacting § 2 of the federal Act, Congress declared a
national policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of the states
to require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the
contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration."85
In remaking history, the Court had made law. Nowhere is the
declaration of a "national" policy-as opposed to the "federal" policy
discerned a year earlier in Moses Cone 86 -to be found in the text of the
statute, its legislative history, or the contemporary apologia of the Act's
sponsors. In subsequent cases the Court would elevate this declaration to
statutory-like prominence, citing not to statutory text or legislative history
but rather to a "national policy" as the basis for its fulsome preemption
jurisprudence.87
4. The FAA's Extension to all Contracts in "Interstate Commerce"
The FAA's original "arbitration federalism" assumed that the bulk of
commercial disputes would be heard in state courts, with only the
admiralty and transaction across state lines going to federal court. The
FAA sought to deal with the latter and left to state arbitration law the
former. But the Supreme Court's post-New Deal jurisprudence revamped
the assumptions of Congress's limited powers, expanding significantly
congressional "commerce clause" powers over matters previously
entrusted to the states. 8
In 1995, the Supreme Court completed its revision of the FAA when
it focused its temporal prism on the meaning of "commerce" in the act. In

84. Southland,465 U.S. at 15.
85. Id. at 10.
86. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
87. See Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 56 (1995); Perry v.
Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 489 (1987).
88. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1,43 (1937) (permitting regulation
of labor relation at manufacturing plant whose work stoppage would have an effect on interstate
commerce); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 123 (1941) (upholding regulation of wages and
hours of workers who produced goods that had an impact in other states).
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Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, the Court held the term should be
understood in light of the Court's post-New Deal jurisprudence, not
according to contemporary understandings of the 1925 legislation's
drafters." In this case, the Court invalidated an Alabama statute applied
to invalidate a pre-dispute arbitration agreement in a consumer termitecontrol contract. 90
Specifically, the Court found that the words "involving commerce" to
be the functional equivalent of the phrase "affecting commerce," which
the Court said normally signals Congress's intent to exercise its commerce
power to the fullest. 9' Building on the Southlandsupposition of a national
policy, the Court held that "a broad interpretation of this language is
consistent with the [FAA's] basic purpose, to put arbitration provisions on
'the same footing' as a contract's other terms." 92 Under the Court's
"arbitration federalism," the FAA carves out no "statutory niche in which
a State remains free to apply its anti-arbitration law or policy." 93

III.

ARBITRATION FEDERALISM: THE BLUEPRINT

By reading the FAA's pro-arbitration, pro-contract philosophy in the
light of currentjurisdictional doctrines, the Court effectively legislated a
new federalism for commercial arbitration. Does the Court's "arbitration
federalism" nullify any meaningful state involvement in commercial
arbitration? Or, consistent with the original assumptions of a federal-state
partnership, does the revamped FAA contemplate a state role? We can
glean an answer from the Court's preemption decisions since Southland.
Ultimately, the twin purposes which the Supreme Court identified as
animating the FAA's enactment also define the scope of its preemptive
reach: to overcome the long-standing hostility to pre-dispute arbitration
agreements and to give effect to the parties' private arbitration agreement.
A. Spheres of Preemption
The Supreme Court's preemption decisions lay out a blueprint for the
preemptive reach of the Court's "arbitration federalism." Most of the
decisions have dealt with state laws inimical to commercial arbitration,
and the Court has shown little reluctance to preempt them. The story for
state arbitration law, structured as a set of default rules, seems quite
different. So long as state law seeks to promote commercial arbitration and
to give effect to the parties' contractual choices, the Court in word and
89. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 275 (1995).
90. Id. at 281-82.

91. Id. at 273-74 (citing Russell v. United States, 471 U.S. 858, 859 (1985)).
92. Id at 275 (citing Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 511 (1974)).
93. Id at 273.
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deed has opened the way for a significant state role. This section explores
the nature of the blueprint.
1. Preemptive Core: Essential Matters Addressed by the
FAA (validity and arbitrability)
The Supreme Court has on five occasions invoked its national policy
favoring arbitration to invalidate state "attempts to undercut the
enforceability of arbitration agreements."94 The common theme has been
that the FAA, at its core, preempts state laws that invalidate arbitration
agreements or limit the matters that can be arbitrated. Specifically, the
Court has struck down
• a California statute that mandated that franchise disputes be resolved
only in court-SouthlandCorp. v. Keating95
• a California statute that limited wage-collection actions to state court,
"without regard to the existence of any private agreement to
arbitrate"--Perry v. Thomas"
• an Alabama statute that invalidated pre-dispute arbitration clauses in
consumer transactions-Allied-BruceTerminix Cos. v. Dobson97
• a New York case that precluded the awarding of punitive damages by
arbitrators-Mastrobuonov. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc."8
* a Montana statute that specified front-page notice in any contract with
an arbitration clause-Doctor'sAssociates, Inc. v. Casarotto.9
Despite concerns that arbitration agreements are often the product of
unequal bargaining-the Justices noted the "relative disparity in
bargaining positions" in franchise agreements"' and the concern for
"exploitative employers" in wage disputes° -the Court concluded that in
each case the FAA left no room for the particular state regulation. Even
when state disclosure requirements did not preclude arbitration in
Casarotto,the Court rejected the state's singling out of arbitration for
suspect status. 102

94. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984).
95. Id. at 17.
96. 482 U.S. 483, 484 (1987).
97. 513 U.S. 265, 281-82 (1995). The Court quoted Justice Hough's observation that the
hostility was rooted in judicial jealousy of any intrusions on their jurisdiction. Id. at 270 (quoting
Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198,211, n.5 (1956)) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
98. 514 U.S. 52, 64 (1995).
99. 517 U.S. 681, 689 (1996).
100. Southland,465 U.S. at 20 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting).
101. Perry, 482 U.S. at 495 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
102. 517 U.S. at 687 (quoting Scherk v. Alberto Culver, 417 U.S. 506, 511 (1974)).
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At its core, as fashioned by the Supreme Court, the FAA reflects "a
clear and manifest purpose of Congress" to preempt a field traditionally
occupied by state law.' On the questions of validity and arbitrability, the
Court has left state law no room to maneuver. In effect, the Court has
occupied the field.' ° Not only can states not declare arbitration clauses to
be invalid, but states are also precluded from creating revocability
standards that apply specially to arbitration clauses. Moreover, any
question of an arbitration clause's revocability on grounds
of fraud,
05
unconscionability, or duress is for the arbitrator to decide.1
Significantly, none of the Supreme Court cases preempting state anti-arbitration rules has involved statutory provisions or case law that was part
of a state's arbitration law. At the core, the Court's preemption analysis
merely aims at cleaning away any lingering anti-arbitration sentiment
found in state statutes and case law.
2. Preemptive Boundary: Non-essential Matters Addressed by the FAA
(judicial stays and enforcement and review of arbitral awards)
The FAA, though "national" in its abrogation of the long-standing
hostility to pre-dispute arbitration agreements, does not contain a
"national" set of arbitration rules. As the Supreme Court has recognized,
many of the FAA provisions are directed explicitly to federal courts, such
as the provisions on court stays and orders to arbitrate0 6 and the standards
for the review and enforcement ofarbitral awards. 7 Other provisions deal
with court procedures that are uniquely federal, such as the appealability
of arbitration orders under the federal "final judgment rule."'0 8 In other
103. Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 157-61 (1978) (stating traditional

preemption standard and invalidating state tanker safety requirements that were more stringent than
federal standards).
104. In fact, Professor Laurence Tribe cites to Southlandas an example of a case finding an
"actual conflict" between federal and state law, where federal and stateenactments are directly and
facially contradictory. TRIBE, supra note 67, § 6-29.
105. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 395 (1967).
106. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. ofTrs. ofLeland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468,476-77
n.6 (1989) ("by their terms [§§ 3 and 4] appear to apply only to proceedings in federal court");
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 n. 10 (1984) ("we do not hold that §§ 3 and 4... apply
to proceedings in state courts"). As Justice Stevens pointed out in Southland,there is no indication
Congress meant to entirely displace state law authority. Id. at 18 (Stevens, J., dissenting and
concurring).
107. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 9 (2000) (discussing procedures for district courts to
confirm award), id. § 10 (discussing grounds upon which district court can vacate award), id. § 11
*(discussing grounds upon which district court can modify or correct awards), id. § 12 (discussing
procedures to give notice of review of award), and id. § 13 (discussing procedures in district court

for vacating, modifying, or correcting award).
108. Federal Arbitration Act § 16 permits immediate appeals from pro-arbitration orders cast
as "final decisions" (such as a final order compelling arbitration), but fails to address the possibility
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instances, important FAA provisions, such as those dealing with judicial
review of arbitral awards, have been interpreted to include implicit
conditions not expressly stated in the statute."°9 On matters that the FAA
addresses, are state arbitration rules bound to mimic their federal
counterparts?
The Court's FAA decisions make clear two points. First, whatever the
arbitration rules laid out by the FAA, statutory arbitration rules are
generally subject to private agreement otherwise."0 That is, the FAA
merely gives effect to the parties' agreement, but does not in itself compel
arbitration. Second, the Court has never stated, or even intimated, that the
areas addressed by the FAA are meant to occupy the field."' The FAA
hardly represents the kind of dense, intertwined regulatory scheme that
suggests exclusive federal regulation of the field."' Instead, arbitration
rules have traditionally come from state arbitration law. In fact,
anticipating a supplemental role for state arbitration law, the Casarotto
Court framed the preemption issue not as whether state law addresses a
matter affecting arbitration, but as whether state law "undermines the
goals and policies of the FAA.""'

of independent interlocutory proceedings (such as mandamus).
109. Stephen L. Hayford, Law in Disarray:JudicialStandardsfor Vacatur ofCommercial
ArbitrationAwards, 30 GA. L. REV. 731 (1996).
110. This is largely true for the UAA. See infra, text accompanying notes 183-86. This default
nature of the arbitration statutes may even extend to the arbitration agreements that specify the
standards for judicial review. See Stephen J. Ware, "Opt-in"forJudicialReview ofErrorsofLaw
Underthe Revised Uniform ArbitrationAct, 8 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 263,267 (1997) (asserting that
parties can specify extra-statutory grounds for judicial review of arbitral awards, such as for
consistency with "public policy," sincejudicial function in arbitration cases is to effectuate parties'
agreement).
11. In some instances, even though state law does not conflict with federal law, preemption
occurs if Congress has validly decided to "occupy the field." Such preemption is not tO be inferred
lightly. See Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963) (stating that
such preemption should occur only if there are "persuasive reasons-either that the nature of the
regulated subject matter permits no other conclusion, or that the Congress has unmistakably so
ordained").
112. Such "field preemption" arises in such areas as motor vehicle regulation, see Castle v.
Hayes Freight Lines, Inc., 348 U.S. 61, 63-64 (1954) (interpreting comprehensive Motor Vehicles
Act to preempt state suspension of carrier), and alien registration, see Hines v. Davidowitz, 312
U.S. 52 (1941).
113. Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 688 (1996). In effect, the Court has
suggested that FAA preemption falls in the "conflict preemption" category, where Congress has
not focused on the issue, and state law is preempted only if it conflicts with the accomplishment
of federal statutory objectives. See English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72,78-79 (1990) (discussing
the three types of preemption: "express preemption" when Congress declares an intention to
preclude state regulation; "implied preemption" when the structure or objectives of a congressional
enactment implies preclusion; and "conflict preemption" when Congress has not addressed the issue
and general policies of federal supremacy apply).
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As to FAA provisions whose applicability in state court is in doubt, the
Supreme Court has made clear that, whatever the FAA may say, it is
subject to private agreement otherwise. In Volt InformationSciences, Inc.
v. Stanford University,"4 the Court accepted a role for state arbitration
law-a "counterpart" to the federal legislation-when its purpose is to
facilitate and rationalize the arbitration process.' In the case, the Court
interpreted the parties' generic choice of law clause to incorporate
California's arbitration rules into their agreement, given the state's
apparent desire to foster arbitration." 6 The Court concluded the parties had
effectively authorized the stay of arbitration (but not its preclusion) to
permit the resolution of pending court litigation between a party to the
arbitration agreement and third parties not bound by it."7 The Court
pointed out that the FAA has no provision dealing with multiparty contract
disputes in which not all the parties have agreed to arbitrate."' Creating an
opening for state arbitration rules, the Court explained: "There is no
federal policy favoring arbitation under a certain set of procedural rules;
the federal policy is simply to ensure the enforceability, according to their
terms, of private agreements to arbitrate. ' 19
The Court lauded the California approach, finding that its rules are
"manifestly designed to encourage resort to the arbitral process" and that
its legislation "generally foster[s] . . . federal polic[ies] favoring
arbitration."' 20 The Volt rule of construction, which effectively
incorporated into the parties' agreement a term there was no indication
they had contemplated, permits state arbitration rules to displace FAA
silence.' 2' This comports with the Court's general preemption approach
not to invalidate state law merely because it may offend some general and
abstractly-framed federal purpose, such as to promote arbitration. 22 In

114. 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
115. Id.
at 470.
116. Id.
117. Id. The California Arbitration Act permits state courts to stay arbitration if there are
pending issues in related litigation involving third parties not bound by the arbitration agreement,
if there might be a danger of conflicting rulings on common issues of law or fact. CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 1281.2(c) (2001).
118. Volt, 489 U.S. at 476 n.5; see also Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213,
218-19 (1985) (accepting that "the Act's drafters did not explicitly consider the prospect of

bifurcated proceedings").
119. Volt, 489 U.S. at 475.
120. Id. at 476 & n.5.
121. Id. at476.
122. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S.
190 (1983) (refusing to preempt state moratorium on nuclear power plant construction, since there
was no indication Congress intended to promote nuclear power "at all costs"). Conversely; state

law is preempted if its manifest effect is to penalize activities that federal law seeks to encourage.
See Nash v. Fla. Indus. Comm'n, 389 U.S. 235,236-40 (1967) (invalidating state law thatprecluded
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Volt, the Courtjustified its rule of construction as consistent with the FAA
policy to legitimate arbitration agreements and ensure that "arbitration
23
proceed in a manner provided for in [the parties'] agreement."'
This rule of construction dissolves, however, when a generic choice of
law clause refers to state law that is hostile to arbitration. In Mastrobuono
v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 24 the Court rejected the idea that the
parties' generic choice-of-law clause incorporated state law that precluded
arbitration of punitive damages claims.1 5 Faced with what appeared to be
the same question as in Volt, the Court refused to infer that the parties had
incorporated anti-arbitration state case law.126 Although presenting its
inquiry as what "the contract has to say about the arbitrability of
petitioners' claim for punitive damages,"' 27 the contract was silent on the
issue, and the Court's rule of construction carried the day in the face of
contractual silence on the issue. 28 The presumption that the parties
intended to make all issues arbitrable, absent an "unequivocal" contrary
intent, supplied the rule of decision. 29 When an ambiguity (or silence)
arises in a contract containing an arbitration clause, the Court explained
"due regard must be given to the federal policy favoring arbitration, and
ambiguities as to the scope ofthe arbitration clause itself resolved in favor
of arbitration."' 30
Both cases turned on how to interpret a generic choice of law clause in
a contract with an arbitration clause. 31 In Mastrobuono, the Court
assumed the parties had intended to arbitrate every aspect of any dispute,
nullifying the state rule that limited the scope of arbitration. 3 2 In Volt, the
Court assumed the parties intended to be bound by state arbitration rules
meant to rationalize the arbitration process, even though the effect was that

unemployment benefits for any fired employee, including one fired for filing an unfair labor
practice charge against her employer under federal law).
123. 489 U.S. at 474-75 (quoting Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2000)) (citations
omitted).
124. 514 U.S. 52 (1995).
125. Id. at 60-61. The Court also rejected that the arbitration clause's reference to the rules of
the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) excluded an award of punitive damages in
arbitration. Id. In fact, the reference to NASD rules, whose arbitration manual contemplates
punitive damages as a remedy, suggested the opposite. Id.
126. Id. at 58.
127. Id.
128. See generally id.
129. Id. at 59.
130. Id.at 62 (quoting Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. ofTrs. ofLeland Stanford Junior Univ., 489
U.S. 468, 476 (1989)) (citation omitted).
at 64 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (finding the choice of law clauses involved in Volt
13 1. See id.
and Mastrobuono to be indistinguishable).
132. See generallyid.
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their dispute would be "litigated rather than arbitrated."'33 What
distinguishes the cases is that the Volt procedures were part of a state
arbitration law "manifestly designed to encourage resort to the arbitral
process"'34 and the Mastrobuono prohibition against a punitive arbitral
award reflected the "ancient judicial hostility to arbitration."' 35
Although cast in terms of party intent, Volt and Mastrobuono are
' 36
essentially decisions concerning the contours of"arbitration federalism.'
State law intended to limit arbitration, absent the clearest drafting by the
parties, triggers judicial rejection. In Mastrobuono,to avoid New York's
limitation on the scope of arbitration, the Court unleashed an interpretive
arsenal.' 37 The Court delved into the rules of the arbitration fora chosen in
the agreement,' 38 it distinguished between substantive and procedural rules
adopted in a choice of law clause,'39 and it invoked the rule of construction
that ambiguities are interpreted against the drafter. 40 On the other hand,
state law meant to promote arbitration receives a judicial embrace, even
when inimical to arbitration in a particular case. In Volt, the Court noted
the pro-arbitration animus of California's arbitration rules and readily
accepted the state court's finding that the parties had intended to
incorporate the rules into their agreement:
133. Volt, 489 U.S. at 487 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
134. Id. at 476.
135. Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 56.
136. This is a novel approach to defining the preemptive reach of federal law. As Justice
Brennan pointed out in his Volt dissent: "Choice-of-law clauses simply have never been used for
the purpose of dealing with the relationship between state and federal law. There is no basis
whatever for believing that the parties in this case intended their choice-of-law clause to do so."
Volt, 489 U.S. at 490 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Attempting to minimize the Court's preemption
analysis, Justice Thomas sought to characterize the Mastrobuono decision as involving "nothing
more than a federal court applying Illinois and New York contract law to an agreement between
parties in Illinois." Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 71-72 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
137. See generallyMastrobuono, 514 U.S. 52.
138. The MastrobuonoCourt considered the stock exchange rules under which the arbitration
was to be conducted, finding that they did not "limit an arbitrator's discretion to award punitive
damages." Id. at 61 n.5.
139. The Court conjectured that the parties might have intended only to include "New York's
substantive rights and obligations, and not the State's allocation of power between alternative
tribunals." Id. at 60. This analysis, applied in Volt to the California rules applicable to bifurcated
proceedings, would suggest an opposite result in that case. If the bifurcation rules were viewed as
distributing authority between courts and arbitrators, then it would not have been covered by the
parties' choice of law clause, rendering it unenforceable. See id. at 67 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
140. Relying on the rule of construction that "a court should construe ambiguous language
against the interest of the party that drafted it," the Mastrobuono Court concluded the brokerage
firm had drafted an ambiguous contract and "cannot now claim the benefit of the doubt." Id. at 6263. The Court failed to point out that applying this same rule of construction in Volt would have
led to the opposite result. In that case, the construction contract had apparently been drafted by the
owner, and its ambiguity argued against using the state's rule on staying arbitration. See generally
Volt, 489 U.S. at 468.
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Interpreting a choice-of-law clause to make applicable state
rules governing the conduct of arbitration-rules which are
manifestly designed to encourage resort to the arbitral
process-simply does not offend the rule of liberal
construction set forth in Moses H. Cone, nor does it offend
any other policy embodied in the FAA. 4 '
Viewing the issue as a potential conflict between state arbitration law and
the FAA' s policy favoring arbitration, the Court concluded the conflict did
not exist. 4 2 Had one existed, however, the strong impression is that the
Court's interpretation of party intent might well have gone the other
way.'43 Thus, when state arbitration law supplements the federal proarbitration
design, the Court has shown a willingness to accept its
44
validity.

3. Preemptive Penumbra: Matters Not Addressed by the FAA
The FAA's coverage is incomplete. The statute, aimed at the
enforceability of arbitration agreements and awards, does not specify the
process of arbitration or the role of courts in that process. For example,
there is no mention of how arbitrators (or judges) should handle prehearing information exchanges, requests for summary disposition without
a full evidentiary hearing, consolidation of multiple claims or multiple
arbitrations, provisional remedies such as interim relief, and the
availability of injunctive relief. Nor have any of the Supreme Court's
preemption cases addressed this penumbra.
Given this silence, general preemption principles presume the validity
of state law. 4' As the Court said in Volt, "There is no federal policy
favoring arbitration under a certain set of procedural rules."' 46 In fact, the

141. Volt, 489 U.S. at 476. The Court noted that "California has taken the lead in fashioning
a legislative response to this problem" of bifurcated judicial-arbitral proceedings. Id. at 476 n.5.
142. Id. at 476.
143. The notion that the FAA governs not only the validity and enforceability of arbitration
agreements, but also "questions of interpretation and construction" arising under the agreements,
has a long judicial history. Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402,409 (2d
Cir. 1959) (commenting that under the "sweeping scope" of the FAA, the two questions are
"inextricably intertwined").
144. In general, the Court has shown a willingness to uphold state law that supplements federal
law. See TRIBE, supra note 67, at 1195-96 & n.3.
145. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528,556-57 (1985) (declining
to infer preemption in the face of congressional ambiguity); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460
(1991) (refusing to construe federal statute to restrict state power unless Congress has made "its
intention to do so unmistakably clear in the language of the statute").
146. Volt, 489 U.S. at 476.
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Court has stated that some matters may be appropriate for state law, such
as whether class action claims can be arbitrated. 4 '
The guiding preemption principle would seem to be whether the state
arbitration rule is consistent with the twin purposes of the FAA: namely,
to overcome hostility to arbitration and to effectuate the parties' arbitration
agreement.148 That is, state arbitration rules should readily pass preemption
muster if their effect is to foster "privately negotiated arbitration
agreements" and to place them on "the same footing as other contracts."' 49
So long as a state does not seek to introduce revocation standards or limits
on arbitration agreements not applicable to other contracts, state arbitration
rules meant to give content to the parties' arbitral intentions further the
FAA's pro-arbitration policy.
Such an approach is consistent with Volt, a case in which state
arbitration law supplied terms in the absence of explicit bargaining. 5 ° If
state arbitration rules supply terms the parties would likely have bargained
for had they considered the issue-that is, "majoritarian default
terms"--arbitration contracts are put on similar grounds as other contracts.
In other contractual contexts, when private intentions are ambiguous or
vague, rules of construction become the operative elements of the
enforceable agreement.''
Whether state arbitration rules could be mandatory, incapable of
agreement otherwise, is problematic under the Supreme Court's arbitration
federalism. Ifterms are made mandatory because any agreement otherwise
would suggest a bargaining failure,'52 this approach contradicts the FAA

presumption that arbitration agreements are valid, unless shown to be
revocable under generally applicable grounds such as duress, fraud, or

unconscionability. For example, any immutable arbitration rule aimed at
147. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 9 (1984) (suggesting that whether class action
claims are arbitrable is a matter of state law).
148. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S.
190,203-04 (1983) (describing preemption principles when Congress has not addressed the issue,
but where state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of federal statutory objectives).
149. Volt, 489 U.S. at 472,478; see also First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S.
938,938-47 (1995); Dean WitterReynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213,219 (1985); Southland,465
U.S. at 16 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 96, at 1 (1924)).
150. Volt, 489 U.S. at472-73.
151. See Ian Ayres & RobertGertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts:An Economic
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J, 87, 87 (1989); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The
Limits ofExpandedChoice:An Analysis ofthe InteractionsBetween Express andImplied Contract
Terms, 73 CAL. L. REv. 261, 261 (1985).
152. Such arguments have been made to explain mandatory terms in corporate law, which
imposes immutable terms on corporate parties, such as fiduciary duties and responsibilities to
creditors. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Debate on ContractualFreedom in CorporateLaw, 89
COLUM. L. REv. 1395 (1989) (summarizing symposium articles on topic of mandatory terms in a
corporate law system of default rules).
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arbitration clauses in adhesion contracts would run afoul of the FAA's
preemptive core.' 53
Can arbitration rules ever be mandatory? If incorporated into the
parties' agreement, whether by a specific choice-of-law clause or general
choice-of-law principles, mandatory rules can be seen as fitting within the
FAA philosophy of giving content to the parties' agreement. Nothing in
the Supreme Court's arbitration decisions suggests that the FAA preempts
party choice of law in structuring the conduct of the arbitration. In fact, the
comments and policy articulated by the Court are to the contrary.
The important question would be whether state arbitration rules, not
explicitly incorporated into an arbitration agreement, but applicable under
choice-of-law principles, should be seen as an element of party choice.
Although language in Volt and Casarottosuggests that the FAA preempts
state laws which render arbitration agreements unenforceable, 54 this
language should be understood as reiterating the FAA's preemptive core
aimed at mandatory rules that undermine enforcement of arbitration
agreements. That is, the Court has not sought to limit what rules the parties
can choose, or be said to have chosen, to govern their arbitration. Just
because a state-provided rule may be outcome-determinative (such as a
rule of mandatory discovery with sanctions for noncompliance) does not
mean that the rule is preempted. Instead, the rule can be seen merely as
giving content to the arbitration promise. In Volt itself, the California rule
permitting a stay of arbitration proceedings had the effect of shifting the
dispute to a judicial forum, but this was not sufficient to render the rule
unenforceable.' 55
Moreover, state-created arbitration rules serve as a check on
arbitration's propriety, adding to its legitimacy. The existence of some
oversight, even in the form of default rules from which the parties can opt
out, is consistent with the functioning of other markets in private law-in
particular the market for corporate charters.'56 That arbitration rules are
formulated by lawmakers, presumably for the public good, not only

153. See Margaret M. Harding, The ClashBetween FederalandStateArbitrationLaw andthe
Appropriateness of Arbitration as a Dispute Resolution Process, 77 NEB. L. REV. 397, 491-93
(1998) (arguing that to create legitimacy for arbitration in contracts of adhesion, either the FAA
must be amended to require notice of arbitration clauses, states must amend contract law to allow
consensual defenses, or arbitration service providers can refuse to administer arbitrations that do
not meet minimum requirements).
154. Volt, 489 U.S. at 478; Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996)
(citing 2 I. MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW § 19.1.1, at 19:4 to 19:5 (1995) (under
Southland and Perry,"state legislation requiring greater information or choice in the making of
agreements to arbitrate than in other contracts is preempted")).
155. See generally Volt, 489 U.S. at 468.
156. This is essentially the role of corporate lawgivers. See Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate
Law Trivial?:A PoliticalandEconomic Analysis, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 542 (1990).
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simplifies the drafting of arbitration clauses, but also permits the
introduction of some balance in the terms of arbitration. If permitted,
lawmakers will be able to address issues of bargaining inequality by
fashioning default arbitration rules that promote arbitration's fairness. If
private parties consider the terms too burdensome, they can opt out and
agree to different terms. But even free market advocates recognize a role
for government in supplying default terms and intervening in cases of
contractual overreaching.' 57
In fact, the Supreme Court has accepted that regulatory oversight
buttresses the legitimacy of arbitration. In deciding that claims under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 are arbitrable, the Court attached
significant weight to the SEC's regulatory oversight of securities firms and
their arbitration procedures. 5 s
Although it might be argued that an FAA-anchored "arbitration
federalism" that recognizes a state rule-making role risks overlapping,
inconsistent arbitration standards, uniformity is readily supplied through
choice-of-law rules that give effect to the parties' choice of standards.
Such a system works well with respect to corporate charters, whose
validity arises as a matter of federal constitutional law, but whose terms
and enforcement are a matter for the state in which the parties choose to
incorporate.' 59 In much the same way, the FAA creates uniform, national
standards for the validity of arbitral agreements and perhaps their
enforcement, leaving to party choice the remaining terms, such as the
process of arbitration and standards of decision. This framework is
particularly efficient in that it allows for different states to compete for
arbitration business by offering arbitration rules that optimally
accommodate the competing objectives of dispute-resolution cost savings
and of fairness. A similar competition in corporate charters has proved
highly beneficial in resolving corporate relational issues.
B. A Blueprintfor "ArbitrationFederalism"
What role does state law have in this revamped "arbitration
federalism"? The Supreme Court's FAA jurisprudence lays out a
blueprint. Drawn from the twin purposes ofthe FAA, the blueprint has two
aspects. First, it is prohibitive: state law can neither be hostile to
arbitration nor undermine the parties' agreement. Second, it is hortatory:
state law must seek to facilitate arbitration and to give content and effect
to the parties' choice.
157. See

RICHARD

A.

EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD

80-82

(Harv.

Univ.

Press 1995) (describing the standard limitations on contractual freedom: duress, infancy, insanity,
and fraud).
158. Shearson/Am. Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 223 (1987).
159. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 93-94 (1987).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2002

29

Florida Law Review, Vol. 54, Iss. 2 [2002], Art. 1
FLORIDA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 54

At a basic level, the blueprint forbids any state law (statutory or
judicial) that singles out arbitration for suspect treatment. 6 ' As Casarotto
makes clear, state law cannot seek to regulate arbitration in ways other
contractual dealings cannot.16' Although the Court has interpreted the FAA
to permit state courts to decide the validity of an arbitration agreement,
under traditional contract revocation standards, the message seems clear
that state courts are to use long-standing, established principles. 62 That is,
arbitration-specific standards of duress, fraud, or unconscionability are
beyond the pale.
Moreover, state law cannot undercut the parties' arbitral agreement.
The blueprint creates a presumption, rebuttable only under traditional
contract revocation standards, that arbitration agreements reflect mutual
party intent. Thus, despite state legislative doubts about the fairness and
efficacy of arbitration, the Court in Southland and Perry v. Thomas
assumed that the parties had chosen arbitration and that the FAA compels
their choice to be respected. 63 But mandatory state arbitration rules, unlike
default rules, stand on shaky ground. Only if the mandate parallels the
FAA's regulation, for example, of the review and enforcement of arbitral
awards, or the mandatory terms are surely those the parties would have
included in their agreement, or the provision is essential to the fair and
effective functioning ofthe arbitration process would state regulation seem
to fit the blueprint.
The blueprint accepts a state role-specifically, state-provided default
terms meant to facilitate arbitration.'" This is the central meaning of Volt,
the only case in which the Supreme Court has passed on a provision in 65a
state arbitration statute that was meant to foster, not hinder, arbitration.1
If the state provision is not hostile to arbitration-but seeks to rationalize
the arbitral process by making it more expeditious, fair, or legitimate-the
provision fits the blueprint. State law need not mimic the FAA, as was the
case in Volt in which the California statute (unlike the FAA) created rules
for bifurcated proceedings. 166 Moreover, in some instances state provisions
160. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 270 (1995) (observing that
Congress passed the FAA "to overcome courts' refusals to enforce agreements to arbitrate"); see
also Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 55 (1995).
161. Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 686-87 (1996).
162. Id.
163. See generallySouthland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S.

483 (1987).
164. See Linda R. Hirshman, The Second Arbitration Trilogy: The Federalization of
ArbitrationLaw, 71 VA. L. REV. 1305, 1378 (1985) (concluding that the state law-making after
Southland is limited to providing "neutral rules of contract formation and enforcement addressed
only to the arbitration clause... [which] will be examined in light of the federal policy favoring
arbitration").
165. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. ofTrs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
166. See id.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol54/iss2/1

30

Hayford and Palmiter: Arbitration Federalism: A State Role in Commercial Arbitration
STATE ROLE IN COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION

may actually limit arbitration, as happened in Volt in which the dispute
was not arbitrated since state provisions gave priority to parallel court
proceedings. 67
In drawing the blueprint, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that
ideally the subject and process of arbitration should be the result of careful
and thoughtful framing of the arbitration agreement. The Supreme Court
has repeatedly emphasized the primacy of the parties' agreement, as when
it engaged in a tortuous search in Mastrobuono for the agreement's
intendment regarding punitive damages.'g If the agreement is incomplete,
however, there is great efficiency in gap-filling default rules. 6 9 Whether
structured as majoritarian default rules, which attempt to anticipate what
most parties would want, or tailored default rules, which leave to a
decision-maker to gauge the parties' particular intent, 7 ' state arbitration
law has the potential to create greater certainty and fairness. If the parties
can choose their arbitration regime or opt out of specific rules-something
absent in each of the Supreme Court cases preempting state arbitration
rules-the blueprint would seem to accept well-meaning state
involvement.
How can states carry out their role? The blueprint does not provide a
single preemption formula. Rather, as we have seen, the Supreme Court's
"arbitration federalism" is concentric and textured. At its preemptive core,
the "national policy favoring arbitration" preempts state laws (judicial or
legislative) inimical to the enforcement of private arbitration agreements.
The Supreme Court has made clear that states cannot interfere with the
front end of arbitration-the validity and enforceability of arbitration
clauses-except "upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract."'' To date, five of the six preemption cases
decided by the Court have involved decidedly anti-arbitration state
legislation or case law. 72 In each case, the Court has concluded
that states
73
are not "free to apply [their] anti-arbitration law or policy."'
At the fringes of this core, in a boundary where the FAA text addresses
certain arbitration matters but with less clarity, the Supreme Court has
seemed to read the Act as countenancing a facilitative state role, so long

167. See id.
168. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 55-64 (1995).
169. See ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIus OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW I (AEI Press
1993).
170. See Ayres & Gertner, supranote 151, at 91.
171. Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483,489 (1987) (citing Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2
(2000)).
172. Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517U.S. 681 (1996);Mastrobuono, 514U.S. 52; Volt
Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468 (1989); Perry,482
U.S. 483; Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
173. See generally cases cited supra note 172.
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as it is consistent with private arbitral choice. In Volt, the one postSouthland case that involved a state arbitration statute, aimed at
promoting arbitration, the provision at issue sought to facilitate arbitration
by (among other things) rationalizing bifurcated court and arbitration
proceedings. 74 The Court construed the parties' agreement as one opting
into the state's arbitration regime-even though the statute's effect was to
give precedence to court proceedings over arbitration." State law that
seeks to vindicate and facilitate the parties' arbitral choice stands on
favored ground.
Thus, state arbitration rules that clarify the procedures and standards
mentioned by the FAA would seem to pass preemption muster if their
form is as a default and their intent is pro-arbitration. This means that state
rules that describe the details of staying court proceedings (FAA § 3),
compelling arbitration (FAA § 4), naming arbitrators (FAA § 5), or
compelling the attendance of witnesses (FAA § 7) would seem to be
appropriate if the parties can still choose their own procedures and the
state rules are meant to facilitate arbitration. The Supreme Court's
statement that there is "no federal policy favoring arbitration under a
certain set of procedural rules"' 7 6 suggests significant latitude for states to
choose court procedures that carry out the basic FAA purposes of assuring
the parties' arbitration agreement is given effect-however the state court
goes about doing this. For example, a state rule that specified a method for
the court to appoint an arbitrator where the parties had not (from a list
submitted by the parties or by reference to an arbitration organization)
would seem consistent with the FAA's purposes, even though it does not
mimic the FAA. Just because the FAA addresses a subject does not mean
it is exclusive or exhaustive.
State rules that address back-end issues-vacatur, confirmation,
modification, and enforcement of awards-are trickier. Here the FAA
addresses these topics with some specificity, such as the grounds for
vacatur. The Supreme Court has not addressed the preemptive effect of
these provisions; the tenor of the provisions is to limit the ability of a court
to undo an arbitral award by hook or crook. Any state rule on these
subjects would have to be consistent with this pro-arbitration intendment,
but not necessarily be slavish to the federal counterpart. For example, a
state rule that mandated a hearing before a court concluded that there had
been a mistake in the award or that there were grounds for vacating
it-though not specified in the FAA-would seem entirely consistent with
the purpose to limit judicial interference with the award. An interesting
question is whether state arbitration law could modify the grounds for
174. Volt, 489 U.S. at 476 n.5.
175. Id. at 479.
176. Id. at 476.
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vacatur, to provide clarity or create additional grounds. Here, to effectuate
the "national policy favoring arbitration," state rules would seem more
constrained. Unless they tracked those grounds specified in the FAA or
inferred by federal courts, state-created vacatur standards would seem to
be off-limits.
Beyond this boundary lies a penumbra as to which the FAA is silent
and the Court has yet to address. With respect to the many procedural
details that arise during an arbitration-such as the discovery of
information, qualifications of arbitrators, the hearing of evidence,
summary disposition and consolidation of claims, and pre-award arbitral
rulings-the potential role of state arbitration law is significant. Consistent
with the twin purposes of the FAA, state law has the potential to fill in and
give meaning to the parties' arbitration agreement and to assuage the
continuing hostility toward arbitration. An example is the uncertain status
of pre-hearing discovery, a matter on which the federal courts are
divided.' State law, cast as a set of default rules, could specify the
content of discovery, the nature of any exemptions, and the methods of
enforcement. Although such issues as arbitrator disclosure of conflicts of
interest, party representation by an attorney, and arbitrator immunity are
not addressed in the FAA and seldom the subject of federal case law, they
are significant to fair and efficient arbitration. Their resolution, whether
by majoritarian or tailored default rules, 7 ' would have the purpose to
effectuate the parties' arbitration agreement.
In fact, state inaction might well be inconsistent with the "national
policy favoring arbitration." The current legal environment for arbitration,
177. Some courts have interpreted FAA § 7 (which is silent on the subject) as permitting
arbitrators to compel pre-hearing discovery from third-party witnesses. See American Federation
of Television and Radio Artists AFL-CIO v. WJBK-TV, 164 F.3d 1004(6th Cir. 1999). The Fourth
Circuit has decided such discovery is available only on a showing of "special need or hardship."
Comsat Corp. v. Nat'l Sci. Found., 190 F.3d 269,278 (4th Cir. 1999). The Fourth Circuit reasoned
that "parties to an arbitration agreement forgo certain procedural rights attendant to formal
litigation in return for a more efficient and cost-effective resolution of their disputes." Id. at 276.
Given the FAA's silence, those courts willing to infer an arbitrator's authority to order pre-hearing
discovery must grapple with how the court's subpoena powers can be used to compel a reluctant
third-party witness. See Amgen, Inc. v. Kidney Ctr. of Delaware County Ltd., 885 F. Supp. 878,
882 (N.D. II!. 1995). In Amgen an arbitrator in Chicago issued a deposition subpoena to a third
party in Pennsylvania. When the third party refused to be deposed, the party seeking the testimony
first moved to compel in Pennsylvania federal court, but was rebuffed since the FAA specifies that
compliance must be sought where the arbitration is conducted. When the party moved to compel
compliance in Illinois federal court, the court decided the party could have its lawyer issue the
subpoena under the same of the Illinois enforcement action and then seek compliance, if necessary,
in Pennsylvania federal court under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45. This "procedural
gymnastics" has been criticized as a flawed reading of FAA § 7, which arguably addresses only
hearings subpoenas, not discovery subpoenas. See Sean T. Carnathan, Discovery in Arbitration?,
Bus. LAw TODAY 22, 25 (Mar./Apr. 2001).
178. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 151, at 87.
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with its many gaps and uncertainties, undermines arbitral efficiency by
forcing the parties to resort to ad hoc judicial litigation to resolve these
open questions. The current piecemeal approach serves neither the
interests of the parties nor the process of commercial arbitration.
In an important sense, the Supreme Court's new "arbitration
federalism" has not been a federal grab. Commercial arbitration, far from
being snatched from state authority to be placed under federal oversight,
was essentially removed from all government regulation and oversight.
Under the watchwords of "private choice,"'79 the Supreme Court has used
the FAA to fashion a protective mantel under which arbitration agreements
are valid and enforceable. In this framework, a state role naturally
arises-through default provisions from which the parties can opt out or
mandatory rules that can be seen as implicit in any promise to
arbitrate-to clarify the FAA's procedural rules and to fill in its gaps.
IV.

STATE ROLE IN "ARBITRATION FEDERALISM"

The resurrection of the FAA by the Supreme Court through its
"national policy favoring arbitration" has led to greatly expanded use of
commercial arbitration over the last fifteen years. For example, in 1981 the
American Arbitration Association (AAA) reported 6,448 commercial
arbitration case filings. By 1992 that number had grown to 13,603. In
1999, the AAA reported 16,882 commercial arbitration cases filed.'
Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services (JAMS), the other well-known
arbitration organization with nationwide scope, reported 15,010
commercial arbitration case filings in 1997 and 18,000 case filings in
1999.181
Arbitration clauses have found their way into the fabric of our
commerce: securities brokerage agreements, Internet purchases, airline
tickets, consumer credit transactions, employment contracts, and
franchiser-franchisee agreements to mention a few. And courts have
accepted arbitration in even the most complex and high-stakes civil
disputes.8 2 Not surprisingly, these procedures routinely give rise to vexing
179. One of the central purposes of the FAA is to give meaning to private choice. Volt, 489
U.S. at 476 (describing federal policy "to ensure the enforceability, according to their terms, of
private agreements to arbitrate"); see alsoMastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S.
52, 57-64 (1995).
180. 2000 Annual Report of the American Arbitration Association available at
http://www.adr.com.
181. Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services (JAMS) 2000 Annual Report.
182. See Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp., 885 P.2d 994, 996 (Cal. 1994)
(affirming arbitrator's remedial order in an arbitration that took 355 hearing days and four and onehalf years to complete); GAF Corp. v. Werner, 485 N.E.2d 977, 979 (N.Y. 1985) (upholding
arbitrability of indemnity claim by the chief executive officer of a public corporation, even though
arbitration raised issues of fiduciary duty normally subject to judicial review during litigation).
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questions concerning the starting, conducting, and reviewing of an
arbitration.
As we have seen, the FAA offers little guidance. Contemplating a
simple procedure between merchants, the framers of the FAA failed to
address a variety of issues. Current state arbitration statutes-most
modeled on the basic elements of the federal Act-echo this lack of clarity
and definition. In this section we identify specific issues susceptible to
state arbitration law. In particular, we consider how well the RUAA
follows the "arbitration federalism" blueprint laid out by the Supreme
Court, and we comment on its method and substance.
A- State ArbitrationLaw: UAA to RUAA
1. Uniform Arbitration Act of 1956
The Uniform Arbitration Act was promulgated by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL") in
1955."83 It was modeled on the arbitration statutes of New York and some
fifteen other states and was intended to "make the arbitration process
effective, provide necessary safeguards, and provide an efficient procedure
when judicial assistance is necessary.""' The drafters of the Uniform Act
intended its terms to "meet problems not anticipated by the parties when
the agreement [for arbitration] was made and for which no provision exists
in the [arbitration] agreement."'8 5 Despite that laudable goal, the UAA is
incomplete, especially when it is viewed in the context of contemporary
commercial arbitration. Among the questions it fails to address are the
following.
Commencement of Arbitration
* How does a party commence an arbitration proceeding?
* Who decides whether the dispute is arbitrable by what criteria?
" Can (must) overlapping arbitration proceedings be consolidated?
Arbitrator Selection
" Must arbitrators disclose facts reasonably likely to affect their
impartiality?
• Are arbitrators (or arbitration organizations) immune from civil
actions?
• Can arbitrators be required to testify in another proceeding?
183. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT, Prefatory Note (1955).
184. Id.
185. Id.
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Power of Arbitrators
" Can arbitrators direct provisional remedies?
" Can arbitrators order discovery and issue protective orders?
* Can arbitrators manage the arbitration process, such as by deciding
motions for summary dispositions and holding pre-hearing
conferences?
• Can an arbitrator order non-compensatory remedies, particularly
attorney fees, punitive damages, or other exemplary relief?.
Power of Courts
" Can courts enforce a pre-award ruling or order by an arbitrator?
• Can parties contract for an expanded court review for errors of law by
86
arbitrators?
Although some of these matters would seem susceptible to party
agreement, the fact is the parties rarely specify the details of their
arbitration.8 7
2. Revised Uniform Arbitration Act of 2000
The RUAA walks a fine line, expanding the UAA while at the same
time seeking to satisfy the preemptive blueprint laid out in the Supreme
Court's FAA decisions. The RUAA Drafting Committee accepted that
"front-end" issues of enforceability and substantive arbitrability are
controlled exclusively by the FAA's "national policy favoring arbitration."
For these issues, the RUAA mostly mimics the FAA. The Committee also
assumed that the validity of an arbitration agreement is exclusively a
matter for state law, under generally applicable state "contract formation"
law. The RUAA creates no special rules concerning consent, disclosure,
consideration, or unconscionability that apply only to arbitration
agreements.
Having fixed the poles of the "preemption continuum," the RUAA
drafters focused their attention on the remaining issues they assumed were
186. REv. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT, Prefatory Note (2000).
187. This is especially true for widely-used adhesion contracts, particularly in businessconsumer and employment settings. See generally Jean R. Stemlight, Rethinking the
Constitutionalityof the Supreme Court'sPreferencefor BindingArbitration:A FreshAssessment
of Jury Trial,Separation of Powers andDue Process Concerns, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1, 17-39 (1997);
Miriam A. Cherry, Note, Not-So-ArbitraryArbitration:UsingTitle VII DisparateImpact Analysis
to Invalidate Employment Contracts That Discriminate,21 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 267, 278-84
(1998); Donna Meredith Matthews, Note, Employment Law After Gilmer: CompulsoryArbitration
of Statutory AntidiscriminationRights, 18 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 347, 370-85 (1997).
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open to state law-making. The RUAA Drafting Committee worked from
the premise that arbitration is a consensual process in which the autonomy
of the parties to frame their own arbitration procedures should be given
primary consideration. Thus, in seeking to supplement the sparse legal
framework of the FAA and filling the voids left in state arbitration statutes
fashioned after the UAA, the drafters cautiously framed the RUAA mostly
as a set of default rules. Those default rules are intended to channel the
law of commercial arbitration process in directions that will ensure that the
process becomes a truly viable alternative to traditional litigation. 8 '
The RUAA also has an interesting renvoi aspect. An arbitration
agreement subject to the RUAA provisions, either by virtue of a
contractual proviso or general choice of law analysis, would seemingly
apply whether the action was in federal or state court. That is, to the extent
any RUAA provisions are different from their FAA counterparts, the
RUAA provisions might be seen as incorporated into the parties'
agreement and thus superseding any federal rules.
B. ProperRole for State ArbitrationLaw
State arbitration law, drafted in the shadow of the "national policy
favoring arbitration," has great potential. Bright line rules can expedite the
arbitration process, particularly given the many gaps and interpretive
pitfalls of the FAA. Compared to judicial case law, well-framed statutory
rules can provide clarity and knowability, as well as the potential for
diversity or uniformity across states. State legislatures, compared to state
judges, have greater incentives to adopt rules that minimize arbitration
costs. Framed as default rules, state rules would facilitate party choice. In
fact, decisive action by state legislatures seems essential to the maturation
and institutionalization of commercial arbitration.
Before the Supreme Court's resuscitation of commercial arbitration,
gaps in the legal framework for arbitration were of little consequence.
Today, the absence of definitive, bright-line standards pertaining to
arbitral matters between submission of a dispute to arbitration and
issuance of the award frequently lead to extended court battles. The
burgeoning state case law on the questions of arbitration procedure,
arbitrator authority, remedies, and the like evidences both the many gaps
in the FAA and the inevitability of a state role in filling them.
Most arbitration-related litigation happens in the state courts. With
little reason to believe Congress will refine the FAA framework,
meaningful clarification of the rules of commercial arbitration must come
from the states.'89 In fact, the Supreme Court's decision in Volt can be seen

188. REV. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT, Prefatory Note (2000).
189. Some writers have assumed that arbitration reform must come from Congress. See, e.g.,
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as an invitation for greater state participation in areas outside the FAA
preemptive core.
But what form should this state guidance take? Perhaps arbitration
rules could be developed, case-by-case, through judicial application of
existing state arbitration acts and development of a state common law for
issues not addressed by those statutes. This approach, however, offers no
guarantee of a coherent product consistent with the FAA. In addition, such
a passive approach would surely take decades to effect.
Statutory rules make more sense than ad hoc judicial interpretation and
law-making. For one, the FAA is silent on many points and incomplete on
others. These gaps are not easily filled, as shown by the current piecemeal
activity in the federal courts, particularly concerning judicial review of
arbitral awards. Neither systematic nor expeditious, judicial interpretation
of a deficient text imposes significant uncertainty and litigation costs on
a process meant to avoid both. Without a complete or determinative text,
judges have had to speculate what arbitration rules the FAA envisions.
Invariably, there has been and will be inconsistency in interpreting the
FAA, with the result that the outcome of arbitration will often turn on
which court considers the arbitration agreement's validity or enforcement.
Default rules, the general approach of the RUAA, also offer the parties
useful short-cuts or starting points in the arbitration drafting process.
Statutory rules that anticipate what most parties would have bargained for,
had they considered the many aspects of their arbitration, create drafting
and negotiation efficiencies. Statutory rules that leave discretion to the
arbitrator on such matters as hearing schedules and protective orders create
the possibility of tailored solutions. Only when a provision goes to the
essence of the arbitration agreement, and opting-out would violate the
spirit of an arbitration, are mandatory provisions appropriate.
State legislatures also have a variety of competencies that make them
more suited to the task. They have greater fact-finding competence than
do state judges, and statutory text can more quickly and permanently
create clarity than textured judicial case law. They have greater experience
in setting default rules meant to reduce the costs of economic activity, as
demonstrated in the movement of the last decade to modernize business
organization laws. They show greater responsiveness to market
participants who rely on default rules. States are also able to experiment,
a luxury much less available to all-encompassing federal law.

Richard E. Speidel, Consumer Arbitration of Statutory Claims: Has Pre-Dispute Mandatory
Arbitration Outlived Its Welcome?, 40 ARIZ. L. REv. 1069, 1069-93 (1998) (urging that the FAA
be revised to assure arbitration agreements are voluntary and that arbitrators provide written
opinions on statutory claims).
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C. "ArbitrationFederalism" BlueprintApplied to the RUAA
The RUAA drafters were keenly cognizant of the concentric
"arbitration federalism" blueprint. Like the UAA, the RUAA retains much
of the flavor of the FAA provisions regarding "front end" issues (stays of
judicial proceedings and compulsion of arbitration) and "back end" issues
(vacatur, modification, correction, and confirmation of awards)-as
demanded by the FAA's preemptive core.' 90 But as to issues mentioned in
the FAA or federal case law, the RUAA cautiously adds new guidance-as
the blueprint seems to contemplate. As to issues not addressed in the FAA,
the RUAA addresses a variety of topics, often with remarkable
caution-even though the blueprint authorizes a greater state role.
1. RUAA and the FAA Preemptive Core
The RUAA accepts the FAA's preemptive core: agreements. to
arbitrate, if valid under state contract law, must be enforced in state
court.' ' As compelled by Southland,the RUAA provision is substantive
and mandatory. The only real departure from the FAA is a provision that
emphasizes the limited role of a court in compelling arbitration: a "court
may not refuse to order arbitration because the claim subject to arbitration
92
lacks merit or grounds for the claim have not been established."'
Although there have been calls for states to bolster the unconscionability
and duress standards for arbitration clauses, the RUAA drafters resisted
the temptation. Nor did they have a choice, as the Supreme Court has
made clear, the FAA does not tolerate arbitration-specific standards.
a. Contract Revocation
The RUAA Drafting Committee concluded that the "equal footing"
rule requiring that the enforceability of arbitration agreements be decided
by the same state law standards applied in determining the validity of all
contracts precludes the states from legislating specific, arbitration-only
enforceability rules.' 93 The major concern here is the enforcement of nonnegotiated adhesion arbitration agreements between parties of unequal
economic strength in the employer-employee, business-consumer,
franchiser-franchisee, and other commercial sectors. There is a split of
opinion among scholars as to whether government regulation of these
adhesion arbitration agreements is necessary in order to protect the
interests of the "little guys" in the world of commerce. 94 Regardless, it is
190. See generallyREV.

UNIF. ARBITRATION

AcT (2000).

191. Id. Prefatory Note.

192. Id. § 7(d).
193. Id. Prefatory Note.
194. See, e.g., Carrington & Haagen, supra note 9, at 384 (citing Thomas J. Stipanowich,
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clear that ensuring that recalcitrant parties to arbitration agreements are not
unfairly forced to honor their arbitration bargains is a task left to state and
federal court judges applying state contract law principles in the
commercial arbitration venue. 195
b. Punitive Damages
The RUAA outlines when and under what standards arbitrators may
award punitive damages. 96 AlthoughMastrobuonomakes clear that a state
law cannot prohibit the arbitrability of a claim for punitive damages, the
RUAA drafters chose to specify when punitive damages claims can be
arbitrated. Under the RUAA § 21(a) "[a]n arbitrator may award punitive
damages or other exemplary relief if such an award is authorized by law
in a civil action involving the same claim and the evidence produced at the
hearing justifies the award under the legal standards otherwise applicable
to the claim." 197 The provision suggests punitive damages can be arbitrated
only when the state permits punitive damages in its courts. Further, the
provision suggests that arbitrators must follow any court procedures
applicable for imposing punitive damages, presumably on penalty of
vacatur.
The RUAA approach is meant to be pro-arbitration. However, it
actually may limit the arbitrability of punitive damages claims beyond that
contemplated by Mastrobuono. For example, punitive damages could not
be awarded under an arbitration agreement subject (under general choice
of law principles) to state provisions modeled on the RUAA, if the state
did not permit punitive damages in a court action involving the same
dispute. If the parties had provided that "all claims" would be subject to
arbitration, the RUAA-based provision arguably would frustrate the
parties' intention and be preempted. Or the state provision, a default rule,
would be trumped by the parties' agreement. In either event, the RUAA
provisions on punitive damages would seem to frustrate the parties'
intentions-a result inconsistent with the "arbitration federalism"
blueprint.
RethinkingAmericanArbitration,63 IND. L.J. 425,452-76 (1988)) (arguing that consumers bound
by unnegotiated arbitration clauses have lost significant due process protections, resulting in a
dilution of substantive rights); ChristopherR. Drahozal, "Unfair"ArbitrationClauses,2001 1I. ILL.
L. REv. 695, 698-771 (finding in a sample of arbitration clauses that both "unfair" and "fair" terms
are common and arguing that business reputation and arbitration organizations constrain
opportunism and make regulation unnecessary).
195. See REV. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 6, cmt. 7 (2000).
196. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 62-64 (1995).
197. REv. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 21 (a) (2000). Section 21(e) stipulates that if an arbitrator
awards punitive damages or other exemplary relief "the arbitrator shall specify in the award the
basis in fact justifying and the basis in law authorizing the award and state separately the amount
of the punitive damages or other exemplary relief." Id.
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c. Arbitral Remedies
Beyond punitive damages, the RUAA addresses two additional
remedial matters. First, it expressly permits arbitral awards of "reasonable
attorney's fees and other reasonable expenses of arbitration[,] if such
award is authorized by law."19 The provision seems largely
uncontroversial, essentially confirming that arbitrators have the power to
include in an award what a court might in ajudgment. Phrased as a default
provision, it would appear to give effect to the usual arbitration agreement.
This seems fully consistent with the "arbitration federalism" blueprint
which accepts arbitration as a substitute for court litigation.
Second, the RUAA permits arbitrators to "order such remedies as the
arbitrator considers just and appropriate under the circumstances" and
specifies that a court may not vacate or refuse to confirm an award
because a remedy granted by an arbitrator "could not or would not be
granted by the court" in a civil action.'99 This provision makes possible
extra-legal arbitral powers. Although a default provision, it seems more a
"penalty" default than "majoritarian;" one intended to compel the parties
to clarify the arbitrator's remedial authority."' 0
Do parties to an arbitration agreement typically agree to give the
arbitrator extra-legal powers, including the power to disregard law? If not,
one of the parties (such as the seller in a consumer transaction) would
presumably insist that such power be excluded. In this sense, a penalty
default would seem inconsistent with the party autonomy or contractual
focus of the "arbitration federalism" blueprint. A provision that parties
would presumably avoid hardly seems consistent with the pro-arbitration
blueprint. Yet perhaps this "penalty" default merely reflects an assumption
about the bargaining process, in which the party wishing to avoid extralegal powers is more likely to be the drafter. And absent an opt-out, the
default protects arbitration finality by preventing a party unhappy with an
arbitration result from seeking judicial review on the ground the arbitrator
granted an extra-legal remedy.2"'
2. RUAA and the FAA "Boundary"
As to the matters addressed by the FAA and federal case law, the
RUAA takes a mostly cautious approach. As to front- and back-end

198. Id. § 21(b).
199. Id. § 21(c).
200. Id. Under § 21(a) of the RUAA, judicial review can be waived contractually.
201. Limiting vacatur is consistent with the contractual view of arbitration. If the parties agree
to accept the award of an arbitrator as final and binding, judicial review through vacatur should not
be available to a party displeased with the arbitral result.
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matters, the RUAA drafters carefully followed the discernible FAA
approach.2" 2 Yet as to other matters, such as arbitrator disclosure and
immunity, the RUAA sets its own independent course.
a. Front-End Issues
On front-end matters, such as judicial stays and compulsion of
arbitration, the RUAA echoes the FAA. For the most part, the RUAA
tracks the FAA standards for judicial orders directing that arbitration
proceed and staying parallel court actions.2" 3 Further, the RUAA codifies
the approach established by the Supreme Court on who decides whether
a dispute is arbitrable, directing the court to decide matters of substantive
leaving to arbitrators disputes over procedural
arbitrability 2 and
4
arbitrability. 0
Significantly, the RUAA drafters simplified the procedure for
obtaining judicial enforcement of arbitration agreements by reiterating the
UAA rule that application for judicial relief (for enforcement of the
arbitration agreement or otherwise) is to be made and decided as a motion,
rather than by trial as provided in the FAA. 20 5 As a result, state actions to
enforce arbitration agreements under the RUAA are not complicated by
jury trial rights, as is true under the FAA. The RUAA also specifies proper
venue in actions to enforce an arbitration agreement.20 6
The RUAA, however, shies from some issues for which guidance
would have been useful. For example, the question of bifurcated
procedures is common when in a multi-party transaction less than all the
parties have an arbitration agreement. Likewise, the RUAA fails to
provide guidance on the procedures for arbitration of class claims.
202. Besides the front-end issues of stays and compelling arbitration and the back-end issues
of involving reviewing and confirming arbitral awards, the RUAA drafters identified three
issues-arbitral awards of punitive damages, arbitrator immunity, and arbitrator disclosure-as
being subject to substantial, ascertainable federal law.
203. REV. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT §§ 6, 7 (2000).
204. Id. § 6(b)-(c).
205. CompareUNIF. ARBITRATIONACT § 16 (providing that"application[s] to the court under
this [A]ct shall be by motion and shall be heard in the manner and upon the notice.., for the
making and hearing of motions"), with Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2000) (which permits
a party alleged to be in default under an agreement to arbitrate, that is not within admiralty
jurisdiction, to demand a jury trial on the issue). This streamlining of the process for determining
the validity of an arbitration agreement has been upheld as a valid exercise of state power. See
Rosenthal v. Great W. Fin. Sec. Corp., 926 P.2d 1061, 1068-72 (Cal. 1996) (determining that the
jury trial rights of Federal Arbitration Act § 4 did not preempt a state statute permitting a bench
determination of the issue).
206. REV. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 26 (2000). It is unclear whether the provision would
apply in federal court, even if the parities had opted into a state's arbitration law based on RUAA.
Arguably, federal venue provisions would apply, even in the face of the RUAA venue provisions
which arose as a matter of private party choice.
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Although there is reason to believe that the FAA's preemptive core would
require arbitrability if all class members had arbitration agreements with
the respondent, the procedures by which class arbitration would be
conducted seem a particularly appropriate topic for state arbitration law.
b. Appointment of Arbitrator
The FAA provides a method for judicial appointment of an arbitrator
(or arbitrators as provided in the agreement) if the agreement is silent or
its appointment or vacancy-filling mechanisms fail.2 7 The RUAA largely
tracks the FAA, authorizing courts (on the motion of a party) to appoint an
initial or successor arbitrator. 2 ' Like the FAA, the arbitrator-selection
provisions of the RUAA give content to the parties' agreement that an
arbitrator will resolve their dispute--consistent with the blueprint.
c. Provisional Arbitral Awards
There is some federal case law on whether a court can grant interim
relief in an arbitration proceeding before an arbitrator is appointed. The
majority view is that courts may order temporary or preliminary injunctive
relief, if necessary to maintain the status quo in a matter that eventually
will be decided in arbitration governed by the FAA." 9 The RUAA adopts
a similar tack, granting state courts authority to order provisional remedies
"to protect the effectiveness of the arbitration proceeding." 210 Further, the
RUAA grants the arbitrator authority to order provisional remedies the
arbitrator finds necessary for an effective, fair, and expeditious arbitration,
to the same extent that would occur in a civil action.211 State courts are
then empowered to enter, after an expedited process, a court order
confirming the arbitrator's provisional remedy, subject to the RUAA's
vacatur, modification, and correction provisions.212
207. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 5 (2000).

208. REv. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 11(a) (2000). Likewise, the RUAA requires that "when
an arbitrator ceases or is unable to act during the arbitration proceeding, a replacement arbitrator
must be appointed... to continue the proceeding and to resolve the controversy." Id. § 15(e).
209. See Peabody Coalsales Co. v. Tampa Elec. Co., 36 F.3d 46, 47-48 (8th Cir. 1994);
Blumenthal v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 910 F.2d 1049, 1051-53 (2d Cir. 1990);
Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Dutton, 844 F.2d 726, 727 (10th Cir. 1988). Contra
Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Hovey, 726 F.2d 1286, 1291-92 (7th Cir. 1984).
210. REv. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 8(a) (2000).
211. Id. § 8(b), cmt. B (citing as examples of appropriate provisional remedies: attachment,
replevin, sequestration to preserve assets, and orders directing parties to undertake certain acts that
affect the subject matter of an arbitration proceeding). The Comment observes that a party can seek
court enforcement of a provisional remedy order issued by an arbitrator under these provisions.
212. Id. § 18. Comment 4 to this section clarifies that an arbitrator's award denying a request
for a pre-award ruling is not subject to immediate court review, but only after the award is issued.
There is no parallel FAA provision addressing pre-award rulings by the arbitrator, though the
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RUAA's approach, which significantly expands the limited federal
approval ofjudicialpower to issue protective provisional orders, clarifies
the court and arbitrator roles. Does it conform to the "arbitration
federalism" blueprint? If an arbitration agreement is meant to resolve a
dispute as fully as would a court proceeding, the importance of provisional
remedies cannot be gainsaid. In fact, any state law that limited the powers
of courts to protect the arbitration process or of arbitrators to fashion
appropriate relief would arguably violate the FAA's preemptive core as
evidencing a hostility to fulsome, effective arbitration.
d. Back-End Issues
On back-end matters, such as vacatur and confirmation of awards, the
RUAA again stakes a mostly cautious course. For example, the RUAA
provisions on modification and correction of arbitral awards follow closely
the FAA, apparently on the grounds that the FAA provisions are
straightforward and the subjects of only sparse case law.213 Likewise, the
RUAA tracks the FAA regarding the entry of a judgment after a court
confirms, vacates, modifies, or corrects an arbitral award.214 On the
assumption little would be gained by deviating from the FAA, the RUAA
drafters played it safe.
This was also the drafters' approach in the one area that has been a
federal jumble-vacatur. The FAA's statutory standards are seemingly
clear and unambiguous.215 Yet the twelve federal circuits have embraced

limited federal case law under the FAA supports the notion that courts may enforce pre-award
rulings. See Island Creek Coal Sales Co. v. City of Gainesville, Fla., 729 F.2d 1046, 1048 (6th Cir.
1984); S. SeasNavigation Ltd. v. PetroleosMexicanos, 606 F. Supp. 692,693-95 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
213. Compare REv. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 24 (2000) with Federal Arbitration Act, 9
U.S.C. § 11 (2000).
214. Federal Arbitration Act § 13(c) (2000); REv. UNIF. ARBIRATION ACT § 25(a) (2000). In
one important respect, the RUAA breaks new ground. The RUAA, unlike the FAA, addresses costs
and attorney's fees and permits courts to allow reasonable costs of the motion to confirm, vacate,
modify, or correct the award. Id. § 25(b). These costs can include attorney's fees and other
reasonable expenses of post-award litigation. The Drafting Committee commented that authorizing
the shifting of attorney's fees and other expenses related to post-award litigation would "tend to
discourage all but the most meritorious challenges of arbitration awards." Id. § 25, cmt. 3.
215. Under the FAA § 10(a), a federal district court may vacate a challenged award:
(1) If the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means.
(2) If there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of
them.
(3) If the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the
hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and
material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any
party have been prejudiced.
(4) If the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that
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one or more nonstatutory vacatur grounds, many with little or no relation
to the stated statutory grounds.2 16 Relying on the Supreme Court's veiled
sanction of the "manifest disregard of the law" ground for vacatur in its
1953 opinion in Wilko v. Swan217 and the "essence from the agreement"
standard drawn from labor arbitration law,218 the circuit courts have treated
the four statutory grounds merely as a baseline.
The widespread judicial adoption of such vacatur standards as
"manifest disregard of the law," a "public policy" exception, and the
manifold judge-made adaptations of the "essence from the agreement"
standard cries out for statutory clarification. The failure of the federal
courts to provide the arbitration bar a consistent, discernible body of
vacatur law when awards are challenged, coupled with congressional
inaction, was tantamount to an invitation to the RUAA drafters to propose
an ordered, uniform state approach.
For the RUAA drafters, however, the specter of federal preemption
carried the day. Worried that the Supreme Court (or even Congress) might
eviscerate or limit vacatur grounds beyond those specified in the FAA, the
RUAA drafters chose a meek solution and essentially restated the FAA's
statutory language.2 1 9 This leaves state courts in a continuing quandary as
to whether the federal common law ofvacatur preempts state court review
of arbitral awards. 2 Ironically, this hesitancy leaves state courts in a
worse quandary than lower federal courts, which at least know which
circuit dictates their approach. Even if the federal courts eventually arrive
at a consensus on nonstatutory vacatur grounds, it is unclear whether state
courts would feel compelled uniformly to follow.
The RUAA drafters also considered permitting parties to contract for
expanded judicial review of arbitral awards on grounds not sanctioned by
current law. By such contractual devices, parties could agree to judicial
a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not
made.

Federal Arbitration Act § 10(a).
216. Stephen L. Hayford, Law in Disarray:JudicialStandardsfor Vacatur of Commercial
ArbitrationAwards, 30 GA. L. REv. 731,757 (1996).
217. 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953).
218. United Steelworkers v. Ent. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960).
219. In this regard, the RUAA is modeled precisely on the FAA. Compare REV. UNIF.
ARBITRATION ACT § 23(a)(l)-(4) (2000) with Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1)-(4)
(2000). The RUAA departs from and expands on the FAA in two respects, directing courts to
vacate an award if there was no agreement to arbitrate and when the arbitration was commenced
without proper notice. REV. UNIF. ARBITRATION AT § 23(a)(5)-(6) (2000).
220. See Paul Turner, Preemptor:The United StatesArbitrationAct, the Manifest Disregard
ofthe Law Testfor Vacatingan ArbitrationAward,andState Courts,26 PEPP. L. REV. 519, 520-21
(1999) (state court judge concluding that state courts are not compelled to apply "manifest
disregard" vacatur ground, though state legislatures could adopt such a rule).
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review (by both lower and appellate courts) for either errors of law or fact,
or both. Whether court jurisdiction could be created by party agreement,
something not expressly contemplated by the FAA, raised questions of
justiciability and preemption. In addition, "opt-in" review could
undermine the finality of the arbitration process, leading the drafters to
" ' This caution,
demur and to wait for more developed federal case law.22
however, hardly promotes the FAA's purpose of giving effect to private
arbitral freedom and can be criticized as accepting an unnecessarily
cramped view of the FAA as both a ceiling and a floor.
e. Arbitrator Disclosure
The FAA addresses, but only obliquely, disclosure of arbitrator
conflicts of interest. Section 10(a)(2) permits an arbitral award to be
vacated for evident partiality by a neutral arbitrator or corruption or
misconduct of any arbitrator (neutral or party-appointed) if it prejudices
the rights of any party.222 Federal courts have held that failure by a neutral
arbitrator to disclose dealings or relationships that cast doubt on the
arbitrator's impartiality can warrant vacatur under the FAA.2"
The federal "materiality" threshold for arbitrator disclosure, however,
is unclear.224 Seizing the opportunity to sharpen and clarify, the RUAA
Drafting Committee laid out a statutory standard for arbitrator disclosure
that places an affirmative, continuing duty on arbitrators to make a
reasonable inquiry and to disclose to the parties "any known facts that a
reasonable person would consider likely to affect the impartiality of the
arbitrator in the arbitration proceeding. '22 An arbitrator's non-disclosure,
or a party's timely objection to a disclosing arbitrator's continued service,
may trigger vacatur.22 6 The RUAA makes a neutral arbitrator's failure to

221. See REV. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 23, cmt. B (2000).
222. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2) (2000).
223. Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 147-49 (1968).
224. This split arises from the divergent standards articulated by Justice Black's plurality
opinion and Justice White's concurring opinion in Commonwealth Coatings. Black opined that
"any dealings that might create an impression of possible" or create "even an appearance of bias"
by a neutral arbitrator constituted evident partiality justifying vacatur. Id. at 149-50. White
advocated a narrower standard requiring disclosure only when an arbitrator has "a substantial
interest in a firm which has done more than trivial business with a party." Id. at 151-52 (White, J.,

concurring).
225. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 12(a)-(b) (2000). Among the facts subject to the
inquiry and disclosure are financial or personal interests in the outcome of the arbitration
proceeding and an existing or past relationship with any of the parties, their counsel or
representatives, a witness, or another arbitrator. Id.
226. Id. §12(c)-(d).
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disclose "a known, existing, and substantial relationship with a party"
presumptive grounds for vacatur.227
Showing none of the caution the RUAA drafters had exhibited toward
vacatur standards, the drafting committee acted boldly in addressing
arbitrator disclosure. The disclosure provisions effectively resolve a split
in federal case law, explicitly link disclosure and vacatur, and openly
address the question of disclosure's timing. The provisions appear to be
mandatory-that is, the parties could not specify a lower materiality
threshold or dilute the effects ofnon-disclosure.228 Although the disclosure
provisions might be criticized as imposing more burdens than necessary,
line-drawing inevitably invites such criticism. The RUAA drafters' desire
to create clarity in substance and procedure comports with the "arbitration
federalism" blueprint by promoting the legitimacy of arbitration and
giving substance to basic standards of arbitrator conduct, standards that
would seem implicit in any arbitration agreement.
f. Arbitrator Immunity
Finding a "functional comparability" of arbitrators and judges, many
federal courts have held that arbitrators are generally immune both from
civil actions arising out of the arbitral office229 and from process when
summoned to testify with regard to that service.23 The RUAA codifies this
federal common law and extends immunity to arbitration organizations,
such as the American Arbitration Association and Judicial Arbitration and
Mediation Services.231 Subject to certain exceptions, the RUAA also
renders arbitrators incompetent to testify in any judicial or administrative
proceeding and shields them from being compelled to produce records
pertaining to the arbitration proceeding, to the same extent as state
judges.232 These provisions appear to fit the "arbitration federalism"

227. Id. § 12(e). This presumption is consistent with and builds upon Section 11 (b) of the
RUAA, which bars an individual with "a known, direct, and material interest in the outcome of the
arbitration proceeding or a known, existing, and substantial relationship with a party" from serving
as a neutral arbitrator. Id. § 11 (b).
228. REV. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 4(b)(3) (2000) provides that the parties to an arbitration
agreement may not "agree to restrict unreasonably the right under Section 12 [of the RUAA] to
disclosure of any facts by a neutral arbitrator." Id. § 4(b)(3).
229. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 511-13 (1978) (establishing that extension of
judicial-like immunity to non-judicial officials is appropriate ifthere is a"functional comparability"
between that official's acts and judgments and the acts and judgments of judges); Corey v. New
York Stock Exch., 691 F.2d 1205, 1209 (6th Cir. 1982) (applying the "functional comparability"
standard).
230. Andros Compania Maritima v. Marc Rich & Co., 579 F.2d 691,697-99 (2d Cir. 1978).
23 1. REv. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 14(a)-(b) (2000) (statutory grant of immunity intended
to supplement any immunity afforded arbitrators by any other law).
232. Id. § 14(d). The exceptions to immunity arise when an arbitrator or arbitration
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blueprint. Not only do they codify the pro-arbitration approach of federal
law, but supplement it with greater protective clarity and certainty.
Moreover, just as federal law in this regard appears to be mandatory, not
subject to party opt-out, the state provisions assure arbitrators of nonwaivable immunity. 33
3. RUAA and the FAA "Penumbra"
As to those issues that neither the FAA nor federal case law addresses,
the RUAA propounds a variety of solutions. For the most part, the RUAA
drafters assumed that federal silence constituted an invitation to active
state lawmaking. This activism was especially prominent with respect to
the arbitration proceeding, which the FAA only lightly touches in its
provision authorizing arbitrators to compel witnesses and documents for
the arbitration hearing.234 Finding no evidence in the FAA's legislative
history or elsewhere that this was the only matter which state law might
address, the drafters assumed state law had wide latitude to improve and
facilitate the arbitration process.
In the end, the RUAA significantly expands the UAA in these regards,
providing detailed guidance on the conduct of the arbitration proceeding.
The RUAA Drafting Committee spent more than three years deliberating
on these procedural matters, and their product is a significant improvement
over the largely silent FAA and the sketchy UAA.
a. Initiation and Notice
The RUAA, unlike the FAA, addresses how an arbitration is to be
commenced. The claimant commences an arbitration by giving notice as
provided in the parties' agreement or, absent agreement, by certified or
registered mail, or by service "as authorized for the commencement of a
' The RUAA also specifies when notice is received. 6 These
civil action."235
organization asserts a claim against a party to the arbitration or when there is prima facie evidence
supporting vacatur on the grounds of corruption, fraud or other undue means, evident partiality by
a neutral arbitrator, or corruption or misconduct by an arbitrator. Moreover, the RUAA allows a
court to order attorneys' fees against a party that unsuccessfully sues an arbitrator or seeks to
compel an arbitrator to testify or produce records in violation of the Act. Id. § 14(e) (applying also
to arbitration organization).
233. Id. § 14(a)-(c).
234. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 7 (2000).
235. REv. UNIF. ARBITRATIONACT § 9(a) (2000). In general, notice is given to another person
by "taking action that is reasonably necessary to inform the other person in ordinary course,
whether or not the other person acquires knowledge of the notice." Id. § 2.
236. Id. § 2(b)-(c) (a person has notice when "the person has knowledge of the notice or has
received notice.., when it comes to the person's attention or the notice is delivered at the person's
place of residence or place of business, or at another location held out by the person as a place of
delivery of such communications").
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provisions, styled as default provisions, provide traditional due process
clarity that has become standard in arbitration. They facilitate an orderly
arbitral process, thus carrying out the parties' agreement. As such, they fit
neatly in the "arbitration federalism" blueprint.
b. Consolidation
Complex, multi-party disputes can propagate multiple arbitrations, and
without some mechanism for consolidation, there is a serious risk of
multiple, inconsistent outcomes. As the Supreme Court noted in Volt, the
FAA provides no explicit guidance, and state courts are split on whether
they can order the joinder of multiple arbitral claims arising from related
facts.237 The RUAA drafters chose a default rule, subject to agreement
otherwise, that empowers the courts to order consolidation in appropriate
circumstances.23 The drafters viewed the rule as a "penalty" default that
would coax the parties to address the issue in negotiating their arbitration
agreement.239 That is, the drafters anticipated that many parties would not
want to be compelled to bring their claims in one arbitration. If so, the
provision skates on thin preemption ice, to the extent it consciously
undermines the parties' intentions.
c. Management of Arbitral Hearing
Questions often arise over the scope and depth of the arbitrator's
authority and duties at the pre-hearing stage, with regard to conduct of the
hearing, in deciding the controversy, and in framing and issuing the award.
The current reality is that the parties seldom address these matters in the
arbitration agreement. Consequently, default statutory standards can play
an important role.
The RUAA speaks in broad terms of the arbitrator's authority to
manage the arbitration process, both before and during the hearing.24 It
asserts that an "arbitrator may conduct an arbitration in such manner as the
arbitrator considers appropriate for a fair and expeditious disposition ofthe
proceeding," including the power to hold pre-hearing conferences with the
parties and at the hearing to "determine the admissibility, relevance,
materiality and weight of any evidence.""24 Significantly, the RUAA
237. Volt Info. Scis. v. Bd. ofTrs. ofLeland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468,470 (1989).
238. REv. UNw. ARBITRATION ACT § 10(a) (2000) ("upon [motion] of a party to an agreement
to arbitrate orto an arbitration proceeding, the court may order consolidation of separate arbitration
proceedings"). The court, among other things, is to balance the prejudice to the interests of the
parties that may be worked by a grant or denial of the consolidation motion. Id. § 10(b).
239. Id. § 3, cmt. 4.

240. Id. § 15(a).
241. Id.Comment 1 to Section 15 confirms that subsection (a) is intended to grant arbitrators
wide latitude, inter alia, in determining what evidence should be considered, observing that the
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provides that any party to an arbitration proceeding that wishes to be
represented by a lawyer is entitled to such representation. 42
Some of the specific arbitrator powers and duties are:
" The arbitrator must give not less than five days notice of the time and
place of the arbitration hearing; the arbitrator may adjourn the hearing
from time to time; and the arbitrator may hear and decide the
even if a party duly notified of the proceeding does not
controversy
243
appear.
" The arbitrator may issue a subpoena for the attendance of a witness and
for production of documents at the hearing.2' Although this provision
tracks the FAA, the RUAA goes on to authorize arbitrators to order the
deposition of witnesses, to permit discovery as they deem appropriate,
and to take action against a noncomplying party in the same manner as
a court in a civil action.14 ' Arbitrators may also issue protective orders
to prevent the disclosure of privileged or confidential information,
trade secrets, and other information subject to protection by a court in
a civil action. 246
• Arbitrators can rule on a request for summary disposition of a claim or
a particular issue, either when all interested parties agree or upon the
request of one party, made with notice to all other parties and after all
parties have a reasonable opportunity to respond. 7 The drafting
committee sought to overcome the judicial hesitancy to endorse
summary dispositions and their tendency to closely scrutinize such
arbitral rulings. 8
* The arbitrator must make a "record" of the award, which must be
signed or otherwise authenticated by the arbitrator.249 The award must
indicate which arbitrators concur in it, and each party must be provided
a copy of the award.250

rules of evidence do not apply in arbitration. The Comment notes further that Section 23(a)(3) of
the Act permits vacatur if an arbitrator refuses to consider material evidence in a manner that
substantially prejudices the rights of a party. Id. § 25, cmt. 1.
242. Id. § 16. Section 4(b)(4) provides that an employer or labor organization, party to a labor
arbitration proceeding, may waive the Section 16 right to representation by a lawyer. Id. § 15(a).
243. Id. § 15(a).
244. Id. § 17(a).
245. Id. § 17(b)-(c).
246. Id. § 17(e).
247. Id. § 5(b).
248. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C.A. § 15, cmt. 3 (2000).
249. REv. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 19(a) (2000).
250. Id. §§ 19-20.
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* The award must be made within the time specified by the arbitration
agreement, or. if the arbitration agreement does not specify a time,
within the time ordered by the court.2"'
* The parties may directly request the arbitrator to modify or correct the
award.252 This solves the dilemma of the common law doctrine of
functus officio, which holds that arbitrators who have issued their
awards are powerless to take any further action, on the theory that the
arbitral office is extinguished with the issuance of the award.253 The
RUAA sets out three circumstances when post-award arbitral
modification or correction is permitted: (1) evident miscalculation or
mistakes; (2) failure of the award to resolve a submitted claim; and (3)
clarification of the award.25 4 This largely restates the FAA grounds for
modification and correction.255
These provisions, except for those related to legal representation and the
subpoena of witnesses and documents, are cast as default terms that can
be waived or modified by agreement.256 This reflects the general RUAA
approach to anticipate and fill in gaps in arbitration agreements, but to also
respect party autonomy when specified.25 7
The RUAA provisions on legal representation, discovery and form of
award-some aspects cast as mandatory provisions-introduce into
arbitration potentially cumbersome procedures that have led many parties
to choose arbitration in the first place. They move arbitration toward civil
litigation-a prospect implicitly shunned in every arbitration agreement.
Some of these provisions are drafted as defaults from which the parties can
opt-out, reflecting an assumption by the RUAA drafters that most parties
would view these procedures as implicit in their bargain. In this sense,
they fit within the arbitration federalism blueprint. But others do not. For
example, is an arbitrator's subpoena power an inextricable element of the
"national policy favoring arbitration"? The Supreme Court has intimated
precisely the opposite: "There is no federal policy favoring arbitration

251. Id. § 19(a).
252. Id. § 20.
253. See Peter Seitz, Problems ofthe Finality ofAwards or Functus Officio andAll That, in
LABOR ARBITRATION-PERSPECTIVES AND PROBLEMS, PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEVENTEENTH

ANNUAL MEETING 165 (M.Kahn ed., 1964); see also Mercury Oil Refining Co. v. Oil Workers

Int'l Union, 187 F.2d 980, 983 (10th Cir. 1951).
254. REV. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 20(a) (2000).
255. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 11 (2000).
256. REV. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 17(a)-(b) (2000). Both of these matters are addressed in
Section 4 of the RUAA, creating a preemption-based imperative for demarcating these matters as
"non-waivable" under state arbitration law. Id. § 4(b)(1).
257. Id. § 4.
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under a certain set of procedural rules." 58 In fact, it is possible to imagine
an arbitration agreement under which each party would be left to its own
proofs, without recourse to the compulsion of further evidence.
Nonetheless, the provisions on legal representation may be justified as
mandatory. The right to counsel for all parties to an arbitration is such a
fundamental element of a fair proceeding that exclusion of that right by
agreement would arguably be ipso facto unconscionable, especially when
the agreement is not freely negotiated between equal parties." 9 In this
regard, this state mandate would seem within the "arbitration federalism"
blueprint. State regulation that assures the fundamental fairness of
arbitration fosters its legitimacy-consistent with the animating purpose
of the FAA.
V. CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's proclamation of a national pro-arbitration policy
emanating from the Federal Arbitration Act abets and assures the
increasing importance of commercial arbitration in civil litigation. The
skeletal nature of the FAA, with its limited focus on the front and back
ends of the arbitration process, leaves a void as to many arbitral matters
that experience has shown can be filled effectively only by thoughtful,
deliberate legislative action. Given the remote prospect of congressional
action to amend the FAA, the task of bringing commercial arbitration into
the 21st century falls to the states.
The arbitration federalism constructed by the Supreme Court presents
the states with both great opportunity to lead and substantial risk of failure.
State rules of commercial arbitration must be founded on a clear
understanding of the role contemplated by the states under this new
federalism. Those who would wish to eviscerate or regulate arbitration by
rejoining at the state level the battles lost before the Supreme Court risk
muddling the debate and slowing progress toward closing a rational,
plausible state response. Refusing to acknowledge the dramatic shift in
arbitration policy and resisting the Supreme Court's pro-arbitration

258. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 476
(1989).
259. For the proposition that there is a fundamental due process right to representation by
counsel in a civil proceeding in a court of law, see, e.g., Texas Catastrophe Prop. Ins. Ass'n v.
Morales, 975 F.2d 1178, 1181 (5th Cir. 1992) ("there is a constitutional right to retained counsel
in civil cases, and ... this right may not be impinged without compelling reasons.") and McCuin
v. Texas Power & Light Co., 714 F.2d 1255, 1262 (5th Cir. 1983) ("the right to counsel in civil
cases is no less fundamental [than the right to counsel in criminal cases] and springs from both
statutory authority and from the constitutional right to due process of law"). Cf Kentucky West
Virginia Gas Co. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 837 F.2d 600, 618 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding
that a person has no general constitutional right to representation by counsel in civil cases).
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imperative would inevitably lead to preemption of any state arbitration
regulation.
The RUAA is an important and edifying act of realism. The product of
a methodical, thoughtful effort to balance the limits on state arbitration
authority and provide a framework for contemporary commercial
arbitration, the RUAA walks a delicate line. It avoids intruding into
matters where the FAA can be seen as occupying the field. Yet its
essentially default nature avoids FAA preemption by giving structure to
commercial arbitration, while respecting the parties' autonomy to choose
their own arbitral agreement. Although some aspects of the RUAA invite
refinement and expansion, any tinkering with state arbitration rules would
do well to do what the RUAA drafters did. Always cognizant of the
"federal arbitration" blueprint, the drafters kept in mind two animating
questions: Does the rule facilitate and foster commercial arbitration? Does
the rule protect and promote the parties' arbitral expectations?
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